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Energy use from wind, solar, and other renewable sources is a public policy at the federal 
and state levels to address environment, energy, and sustainability concerns. As the cost 
of renewable energy is still relatively high compared to fossil fuels, it remains a critical 
challenge to make renewable energy cost competitive, without relying on public subsidies. 
During recent years, much advance has been made in our understanding of technology 
innovations and cost structure optimization of renewable energy. A knowledge gap exists 
on the other side of the equation – revenue generation. Considering the complexity and 
stochastic nature of renewable energy projects, there is great potential to optimize the 
revenue generation mechanisms in a systematic fashion for improved profitability and 
growth.  
This dissertation examines two primary revenue generation mechanisms, or offtake 
strategies, used in wind energy development projects in the U.S. While a short-term 
 
 
offtake strategy allows project developers to benefit from price volatility in the wholesale 
spot market for profit maximization, a long-term offtake strategy minimizes the market 
risk exposure through a long-term Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). With Conditional 
Value-at-Risk (CVaR) introduced as a risk measure, this dissertation first develops two 
stochastic programming models for optimizing offtake designs under short and long-term 
strategies respectively. Furthermore, this study also proposes a hybrid offtake strategy 
that combines both short and long-term strategies. The two-level stochastic model 
demonstrates the merit of the hybrid strategy, i.e. obtaining the maximized profit while 
maintaining the flexibility of balancing and hedging against market and resource risks 
efficiently. The Cape Wind project in Massachusetts has been used as an example to 
demonstrate the model validity and potential applications in optimizing its revenue 
streams. The analysis shows valuable implications on the optimal design of renewable 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
1.1 Renewable Energy and Wind Power 
In recent years, controversial issues between the increase of energy consumption and the 
inevitable environmental impacts have become key incentives for people to propose sustainable 
strategies to balance the energy use and environmental protection. Energy efficiency and 
renewable energies are regarded as the “twin pillars” of sustainable energy policy. While energy 
efficiency is to slow down the energy demand growth and avoid waste of resources, renewable 
energies are essential to generate more clean energy alternatives so as to make deep cuts in fossil 
fuel use (Prindle et al. 2007).  
Renewable energies, generated from natural resources such as sunlight, wind and water etc., are 
inexhaustible energies that can potentially substitute traditional sources of fossil fuels to supply 
final energy consumptions. Since the renewable energies are clean and can be continually 
replenished through natural resources, they provide substantial reduction for carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gas emissions hence become the most significant potentials to solve the climate 
change problem we are facing. A long-term plan towards renewable energies use is also regarded 
as one of the most critical means for many countries to attain national goals such as energy 
supply diversification, energy security, energy access for the public and the creation of green jobs 
(SARI 2010, IEA 2010, Lund, Østergaard, and Stadler 2011, Anderson and Winne 2007, Ayres 
2008). Furthermore, renewable energy development strategies are increasingly important for the 
whole world to establish a three-pillar-sustainability, aiming at the balance between the 
environment, the social equity, and economic demands (UNGA 2005).  
Although renewable energy still accounts for a small portion of all energy sources, the 
deployment of renewable energy, especially in the electricity generation industry, has been 
developing rapidly in recent years. As of year 2012, renewables accounted for almost half of the 
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new electric capacity installed globally, so that total renewable power capacity worldwide 
exceeded 1470 GW in 2012, up about 8.5% from 2011 (REN21 2013). It is estimated by the 
International Energy Association (IEA) with the energy outlook towards year 2035 that although 
coal remains the backbone of the electricity generation, its share of the mix will be eroded from 
two-fifths to one-third. Instead, generation from renewable energies will grow to almost three 
times its 2010 level by 2035; its share in the total energy generation mix will grow from 20% to 
31% (IEA 2012b). 
Among all the modern renewable energies, wind power receives the most attention. The 
worldwide cumulative installed wind capacity has witnessed a 25% annual growth rate for the 
recent two decades (Figure 1-1). Wind power developments are widely acknowledged to have 
achieved the “mainstreaming” among businesses, governments, consumers, and utilities, 
especially considering that the majority of annual global investment in power generation is now 
flowing to renewable energy instead of fossil fuels and nuclear (REN21 2013b, BNEF/UNEP 
2012, Schneider et al. 2009).  
 
Figure 1-1 Development of Worldwide Wind Energy Generating Capacity (GWEC 2012).  
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Regulatory schemes are the most important incentives for wind project development and 
investment. Although the cost for wind projects have decreased dramatically with advanced 
technology and due to learning curve effect, the wind projects are still in need of external support 
to be competitive with other conventional power plants (LAZARD 2011). The renewable energy 
policy schemes in different countries are continuously revised and adjusted, and some of the 
countries are using multiple approaches. 
The most widely used policy incentive is a special price applied to wind power, usually known as 
the “fixed feed-in tariffs”. Such feed-in tariffs are defined by the governments as the power 
purchase price that local distribution or transmission companies have to pay for local wind power 
generation that is fed into the network. Fixed feed-in tariffs reduce the financial risk for wind 
power investors as the power purchase price is basically fixed over at least 10 to 15 years. Feed-in 
tariffs have been the main driver for wind power in many of the European countries such as 
Germany, UK and Denmark (GWEC 2012, Ackermann 2012), and they are getting more popular 
in Asian countries. In India it is called Generation Based Incentive (GBI), applying certain tariff 
for applied projects (Kumar et al. 2010, GWEC 2012b). Japan and Korea are using an enhanced 
feed-in tariff in the form of an explicit monetary reward provided for wind-generated electricity, 
usually paid by the utilities (Van Kooten and Timilsina 2009).  
Another typical approach used is a form of quota system with certificate trading for renewable 
energies. With this approach, utilities are allocated with fixed quotas from the government 
regarding the amount of renewable energy per year they have to sell via their network. The 
fulfillment of the obligation is evaluated through the certificate in align with the amount of 
energy fed into the grid. In European countries it is known as “Fixed Quotas Combined with 
Green Certificate Trading” or the Renewable Obligation Certificate (ROC) scheme, for example 
in Italy, Sweden and Belgium (Ackermann 2012, GWEC 2012). Similarly, the Chinese 
government prioritizes wind energy for selected provinces with the best wind resource and set 
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targets for them (GWEC 2012c). Australia is using a Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 
(MRET) scheme, requiring electricity retailers to source specific proportions of total electricity 
sales from renewable energy sources according to a fixed timeframe (GWEC 2012). In the U.S., 
the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is a similar quota system, which requires utilities to 
purchase a percentage of their overall generating capacity from renewable resources. 
In addition, various subsidies, grants, rebates and tax incentives are also often implemented to 
stimulate wind power growth. For example, the U.S. is using the federal Production Tax Credit 
(PTC) as the major driver for wind power development, providing a tax credit for electricity 
generated from utility-scale wind turbines. Addition to the PTC, developers can also choose a 30% 
Investment Tax Credit (ITC) for smaller turbines.  
1.2 Wind Power in the U.S. and Its Development Trends 
The U.S. is leading the development of renewable energy due to its vast natural resources and 
advances in technique and project deployment. By year 2012, all the renewable energies capacity 
developed in the U.S. is around 86 GW, accounting for more than 1/6 of global capacity 480 GW. 
Among all the new 86 GW renewable power capacities added in 2012, wind energy accounts for 
the most capacity, for about 70% (60 GW), and has the fastest growing tendency of  39%, 
followed by solar (30%) and hydropower (25%) (REN21 2013).  
Actually, with the terrain suitable for large-scale wind farm development, wind energy has been 
proved to be an important part in the U.S. long-term energy generation mix strategy. The U.S. 
accounted for around 21% of the new grid-connected wind turbines worldwide between the end 
of 2000 and the end of 2012 (GWEC and IRENA 2013). It has been in the top three countries 




Table 1-1 Operational Wind Power Capacity Worldwide. Source: Various edition of Wind Power 
Monthly and GWEC Global Wind Reports. For 2012 GWEC report, see (GWEC 2012). 
Region 

















North America 1,676 2,695 4,708 7,184 13,062 27,542 44,189 67,576 
 
United States 1,655 2,578 4,625 6,725 11,603 25,170 40,180 60,007 
 
Canada 21 117 83 459 1,459 2,372 4,009 6,200 
Europe 2,518 129,772 21,319 34,401 48,545 65,564 86,272 109,581 
 
Germany 1,136 6,288 11,994 16,629 20,622 23,903 27,214 31,308 
 
Spain 145 2,335 3,337 6,203 11,615 16,754 20,676 22,796 








11 103 137 2,089 508 629 2,010 3,505 
Middle East and 
Africa 
13 141 149 225 433 669 1,079 1,135 
TOTAL 
Worldwide 
4,844 17,706 29,140 47,252 74,215 120,416 197,035 282,587 
 
In the year 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy published a groundbreaking technical report 
named “20% Wind Energy by 2030: Increasing Wind Energy's Contribution to U.S. Electricity 
Supply”, examining the cost, major impacts and challenges associated with the 20% wind energy 
scenario and comparing it with the scenario which no new U.S. wind power capacity is installed. 
According to the report, the 20% scenario requires U.S. wind power capacity to grow from 17 
GW at the 2008 level to more than 300 GW over 23 years. Over 46 states would experience 
significant wind development (DOE 2008). New wind power installations would increase to more 
than 16,000 MW per year by 2018, and continue at that rate through 2030 (Figure 1-2). Updated 
with the actual new capacity that has been added in recent years (indicated by the red outlines in 
Figure 1-2), the actual installation capacity is increasing with a stronger trend, and exceeds the 






Figure 1-2 Annual and Cumulative Wind Installations by 2030 in the 20% Scenario. Figure 
adapted from (DOE 2008) and (AWEA 2013b). 
The report finds that the U.S. possesses affordable wind energy resources far in excess of those 
needed to enable a 20% scenario. However, it also points out that the realization of the 20% wind 
scenario involves major national commitment and planning, as well as overcoming challenges in 
the areas of technology, manufacturing, transmission and integration, markets, environment and 
siting, etc. (DOE 2008). 
The wind industry in the U.S. has gone through three important phases of development since the 
1970s. With the increasing penetration of wind energy, the business models for wind project 
development gradually changed, and the structure of the U.S. energy industry and electricity 
market have been influenced correspondingly. Given ambitious expansion goals in the next 30 
years, the financing for wind projects is expected to evolve from policy-supported to market-
based. 
The first phase of wind projects happened before 1992 when a series of federal energy programs 
were established to deal with the oil crisis and secure the country’s long-term energy needs 
(Sissine 2006). The 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) required utilities to 
purchase power, at the utility’s avoided cost, from third parties with more environmentally 
friendly facilities. It was PURPA that created a market for renewable energy independent power 
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producers (IPPs), and successfully made those small-scaled wind producers economically viable 
(GWEC and IRENA 2013). With constraints in technology and funds, the wind projects 
developed during that period were small-scale production with capacity less than 1000 kw, with 
typical wind turbine sizes of less than 100 kw applied in home-use, small facility-use, or at most, 
small-community use.  
The second phase of wind projects was from 1992 to 2008. Enacted in 1992, the federal 
Production Tax Credit (PTC), was the major driver for wind power developed during that period. 
PTC provides a certain amount of tax credit for wind energy generated from utility-scale wind 
project, thus largely promote the development of large-scale wind project. In this phase, the U.S. 
wind industry rapidly expanded, with the average turbine size reaching 1660 kw by the end of 
2008 (Wiser and Bolinger 2012). The installed capacity grew at a compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of 39% from 2004 to 2008 (GWEC 2012, FERC 2009). However, it is worthy notice 
that the development trend of the wind fluctuated due to an unstable policy climate. With the PTC 
being expiring on several occasions, there occurred a cycle of strong growth and slowdowns 
accordingly (Figure 1-3). This policy uncertainty caused loss of investor confidence, under-
investment in manufacturing capacity, and variability in equipment and supply cost (GWEC 
2012).  
 
Figure 1-3 Historic Impact of PTC Expiration on Annual Wind Installation (AWEA 2013b).  
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The wind industry has been undergoing a new phase starting after year 2008, with the key feature 
of market maturity. Projects are developed with even larger capacity that can grow to several 
hundred MW, with higher economic scale. Increased rotor diameters and hub heights would be 
expected to improve capacity factors and project efficiencies (Wiser and Bolinger 2012). The cost 
has declined due to the advancement of manufacturing and construction technology, as well as 
increased competition among manufacturers and a shift to a buyer’s market (GWEC and IRENA 
2013). During this phase, most of the wind power projects are developed by independent power 
producers (IPPs). According to the DOE wind technology market report, IPPs owned 73% of all 
new wind power capacity installed in 2011, and 82% of the cumulative installed capacity (Wiser 
and Bolinger 2012).  
In addition to the PTC incentives, Renewables Portfolio Standards (RPS) served as the most 
popular form of policy supporting the deployment of renewable energy technologies at the state 
level. With more strict energy requirements from renewable resources, there has emerged a larger 
and more mature renewable energy certification (REC) trading market, which imposes market-
based demand for wind power development. The demand not only comes from utility companies, 
but a large amount of it also comes from government agencies (such as the Department of 
Transportation), institutional electricity buyers (such as schools and hospitals), business energy 
users (such as supermarkets, computer server centers), energy traders and even individual 
householders. The diversification has brought vitalities to the wind market, and gradually changes 
the business model for wind energy project development. 
Furthermore, some other markets and programs with broader scopes could also influence the 
development of renewable energy, such as the carbon market, and carbon emission policies. One 
typical market that is growing is the carbon trading market, with which if the emitters are 
approaching their quotas, they could try to develop or outsource their business to some clean 
resources such as wind energy. Although no federal emissions trading market has been 
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established in the U.S., regional markets are in place or are under development, including the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), Western Climate Initiative (WCI), and the 
Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord (MGGA). 
1.3 Research Needs and Problem Definition for Wind Project Offtake Strategies 
As the cost of renewable energy is still relatively high compared to fossil fuels, it remains a 
critical challenge to make renewable energy cost competitive, without relying on public subsidies. 
During recent years, many advances have been made in our understanding of technology 
innovations and cost optimization of renewable energy. There is however a knowledge gap on the 
other side of the equation – revenue generation. Considering the complexity and stochastic nature 
of renewable energy projects, there is great potential to optimize revenue generation mechanisms 
in a systematic fashion for improved profitability and growth. 
The offtake of a project is defined as the revenue generation strategy of how the project is selling 
its product and realizes its profit. The offtake strategy of a project can be an analog to the sales 
strategy for a company. While profitability remains the primary objective, another important 
metric of evaluating the strategy is the stability of future revenues. Also, the control of the 
revenue risk is key for a company’s steady development. And for projects, controlling the 
revenue risk is a guarantee for stable future revenue streams thus can largely increase the 
possibilities of the projects’ success. A well-designed offtake plan will also help to justify the 
feasibility of the project in the initial phase, enhance the bankability for project financing, and 
thus essentially reduce the overall levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for wind energy. 
If the product of the project is sold through a competitive market, the project offtake strategy 
deals with the production quantity, selling schedule and price in the market. While if the product 
is sold through contracts with buyers, then the problem becomes the contract design and 
negotiation of the detailed terms. As for wind power IPPs, selling the power directly to the market 
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can be treated as short-term offtake strategy, since the decision making in the electricity 
wholesale market is usually hourly based. On the other hand, signing contract with the buyer is 
usually a long-term decision. Current power purchase agreements (PPA) typically have contract 
terms effective for 5-25 years.  
Short-term spot market offtake and long-term PPA are both viable for wind projects, and 
sometimes can be combined. According to the American Wind Energy Association’s (AWEA) 
annual market report, 85% of the wind power capacity installed by Independent Power Producers 
(IPPs) in 2012 was contracted under long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs), and 15% was 
sold in the short-term spot market (AWEA 2013b).  
Either option has its own pros and cons, thus why there is a market preference for the selection, 
how to specifically apply them, and whether there is a more efficient way to combine and balance 
the trade-off between the two is the key questions. The three main questions to answer through 
this dissertation can be identified as: 
1. How should wind IPPs operate when they are participating in the electricity wholesale spot 
market?  
In the U.S. deregulated power market, wind Independent Power Producer (IPPs) are regarded as 
generating companies (GENCOs), and are obliged to follow the rules of the Day-Ahead (DA) 
forward market and the Real-Time (RT) balance market. For traditional power plants such as coal 
and nuclear plants, their strategies are to maximize profit by bidding generation amounts and 
schedules based on their own manufacturing cost and estimation of the market supply-demand 
equilibrium (Borenstein 2000). For wind IPPs, since the generation amount solely depends on the 
actual wind resource, the bidding strategy they make in the forward market could incur high 
uncertainties when they realize their profit. In practice, wind IPPs usually bid at the 50 percentile 
of their generation estimation for maximizing their expected profit, but they fail to consider the 
possible risks and the corresponding probabilities. In Chapter Three of the dissertation, a more 
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general optimization model is proposed to design wind project bidding strategies under 
uncertainty. The metric of Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) is proposed as the measure to the 
project revenue risk. The project developer is expected to adjust their bidding strategies with 
uncertainties taken into consideration. 
2. How should wind IPPs design the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) as their long-term 
offtake strategy? 
As shown in the AWEA annual market report, more wind IPPs choose PPA as their strategy, this 
is not only because they will get a promised offtake, but also because they are expecting more 
stable cash flow streams. However, in practice, there lacks a systematic method for project 
developers to analyze their negotiation position, and sometimes they have to accept some onerous 
terms requested by power purchasers so as to sign off as much offtake as possible to get the 
project started (Umanoff 2008). Furthermore, the traditional approach for valuing a PPA is to take 
the projected annual cash flow based on the forecasted electricity price and the cost, and then 
discount the expected future profits by the cost of capital of the investing firm. The project’s 
feasibility is then evaluated by comparing the profit with the initial cost (Deng 1999). This so-
called discounted cash flow (DCF) approach becomes inappropriate for the wind project, 
especially in the deregulated electricity industry because (1) it doesn’t address the uncertainty of 
the wind resource, which have seasonal trend and can be fluctuating severely within a year; and 
(2) it doesn’t capture the volatility of the market electricity, which can be treated as the 
opportunity cost for the wind project. In Chapter Four, these two problems will be addressed and 
a modified stochastic programming model will be proposed to seek the optimized long-term PPA 
offtake strategy, considering the discounted cash flow, CVaR of the profit risks, and a chance-
constraint related to the market value of the electricity production. 
3. Is there a more efficient way for wind IPPs to combine short-term and long-term offtake 
strategies, and balance the profit and risks? 
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With the previous two strategies, wind IPPs either choose a short-term offtake in the spot market, 
or sign long-term PPAs with purchasers, there is no flexibility to opt between the two. Although 
some large wind projects are divided into small sub-projects, and are allocated to different offtake 
strategies, the wind IPPs still have no control over the offtake approach for each sub-project. In 
an uncertain environment, however, it is important to hold options during the operation so as to 
balance or hedge against different scenarios due to volatile exogenous factors (Birge and 
Louveaux 2011). In Chapter Five, an extended hybrid model is presented, which enables the wind 
IPP to establish a more flexible mechanism for his wind production offtake. A two-level 
stochastic model is built, with the first level to design the PPA contract with detailed terms before 
the project starts, and the second level to optimize the allocation of the energy production 
between the PPA and the spot market. This recourse process will enable the project developer to 
take into consideration of the uncertainties on the weather and the power market during the 
operation, and make contract design and negotiation accordingly. 
1.4 Dissertation Structure and Research Plan 
The issues discussed above justify a dedicated research towards the study and design on offtake 
strategies for wind energy projects. With an extensive problem definition and background review, 
we extend the research based on three different offtake strategies, namely the short-term, the 
long-term and hybrid strategy. Each of the strategy types are discussed and modeled in detail for 
one specific chapter. A single empirical case study is defined and is applied throughout the three 
strategies, for the purpose of validating different strategies and comparing them with each other. 




Figure 1-4 Dissertation Structure in terms of Chapter Contents 
Although the boundary of this dissertation is defined as a single wind energy project, when 
building the models, the relationships with the backend, technology-related research and frontend, 
market-based problems will be considered (Figure 1-5).  
 
Figure 1-5 Framework for the Research Need and Relative Topics 
In particular, the analysis of the uncertainty from the wind resource, together with the wind 
turbine specifications and its power generation efficiency are key issues associated with the 
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project output risks. Meanwhile, the economic features of the power market and the general 
political environment are the major impacts that define the value and its volatility of the project’s 
products. On the other hand, the project finance and risk controls during the project operation 
phase are closely related to its offtake strategies, hence will be specifically discussed and 
involved in the models. Furthermore, various methodologies are identified to support the research, 
and mathematical models are built accordingly. For example, a Cournot model is built to depict 
the electricity wholesale market equilibrium with renewable GENCOs; a chance-constrained 
stochastic model is utilized to guarantee the no-regret of the PPA buyer; and an affine controller 
is proposed to quantitatively describe the project operation strategy in the dynamic uncertainties, 
etc. Detailed processes of methodology selection are discussed in each chapter. 
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Chapter 2.  Review of Literature and Modeling Methodology 
2.1 Background for Wind Resource and Wind Speed Profile 
Firstly, we would like to review some background of the wind resource, including the formation, 
the patterns of the wind speed, and the influence factors. These reviews are fundamental 
information to help build quantitative analysis for wind resource for a certain project. The wind 
speed varies as a function of time, temperature, height, and other random factors. All these make 
wind speed appear to be quite random, however, it actually has some distinct features. Therefore, 
an understanding of these wind speed patterns, and the factors that influence the uncertainties is 
critical for the evaluation of potential wind energy sites. 
The original source of the global winds is caused by solar radiation. The variations in the 
atmospheric pressure field due to the uneven heating of the earth cause air to move from high to 
low pressure. Due to the roughness of the ground, the wind conditions near the ground, which is 
known as the planetary boundary layer, is turbulent (Manwell, McGowan, and Rogers 2002, 
Ackermann 2012). The characteristics of this boundary layer are directly applicable to wind 
energy applications (AWEA 1988).  
Measuring the intensity of the wind first originated from marine applications. To correlate the 
wind force scale to real, measurable wind velocity, the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) drafted a standard table, measuring the wind force by the Beaufort scale (WMO 2012). 
The current generation of wind turbines usually starts operating at a light breeze and will shut 
down for protection for violent storm or hurricane. In Beaufort terms this would be an operational 
window between scale 3 and 10 (Table 2-1). 
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Table 2-1 Beaufort Scale with Equivalent Wind Speed and Description (WMO 2012).  
 
The wind patterns associated with height, air pressure, and temperature are relatively 
straightforward, based on fundamental principles of physics. There are various studies concerning 
the influence from these factors to the wind patterns (Balmer 1990, Justus 1978, Baumeister, 
Avallone, and Baumeister III 1978). Of the most importance, the variation of wind speed with 
elevation is called the vertical profile of the wind speed or vertical wind shear, which directly 
determines the productivity of a wind turbine on a tower of certain height (Figure 2-1). Scientists 
are more concerned with the “instantaneous” wind profile which measures the wind affects at 
different height, and are related via the similarity theory of boundary layers (Schlichting and 
Kestin 1968).  
 
Figure 2-1 Vertical Wind Speed Profile (Van Der Tempel 2006) 
Two mathematical models have generally been used to model the vertical profile of wind speed 
over different terrains (e.g., seas, fields, and forests). Both approaches are subject to uncertainty 
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caused by the variable, complex nature of turbulent flows (Hiester and Pennell 1981). One 
approach is called Power Law, which assume that the ratio of the wind speed at different height 









Where 𝑈(𝑧) is the wind speed at height 𝑧, 𝑈(𝑧𝑟) is the reference wind speed at height 𝑧𝑟, and 𝛼 
is the power law exponent. In practice, the exponent 𝛼 is a highly variable quantity, varies with a 
lot parameters such as elevation, time of day, season, nature of the terrain wind speed, 
temperature, and various thermal and mechanical mixing parameter (Manwell, McGowan, and 
Rogers 2002). Many researchers developed methods to calculate 𝛼, while some others feel that 
the complicated approximations reduce the simplicity and applicability of the power law, hence 
some more straightforward approached is needed (Justus 1978, Counihan 1975, Spera 1994).  
The second approach called Logarithmic Profile, as known as the Log Law, is used by many wind 
energy researchers. It is based on a combination of theoretical and empirical research, and origins 
from the boundary layer flow in fluid mechanics and in atmospheric research (Manwell, 
McGowan, and Rogers 2002). Wortman gave a comprehensive analysis of the methodologies that 
predict the logarithmic wind profile through the mixing length theory, eddy viscosity theory, and 
similarity theory (Wortman 1983). The log law is basically used to extrapolate wind speed from a 










Different with the power law, this approach introduces another parameter 𝑧0, which represents 
different surfaces roughness, and can be obtained through experiments. This method can be easily 
utilized as long as the terrains where the wind projects are proposed to be built are identified. For 
example, for the offshore wind project, 𝑧0 should be valued at 0.0005m (as Blown Sea, according 
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to the Table 2-2). Then the wind speed that is captured by the anemometers in the meteorology 
station can be adjusted given the height of the turbine tower, and the actual air flow that is acting 
on the wind turbine can be calculated accordingly.  
Table 2-2 Value of Surface Roughness Length for Various Types of Terrain (Burton et al. 2011).  
 
In order to get a comprehensive analysis for wind resource for a specific project site, meteorology 
information are needed, such as the wind speed, wind direction, temperature, humidity and so on.  
In this dissertation, we will use the meteorology station data from National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) database for the historic wind speed and direction at a 15 
min interval (NOAA 2013). The Log Law will be used to estimate the wind resource in terms of 
the height. And for simplicity, we assume that the other factors such as temperature and pressure 
do not significantly change the instant wind speed, hence we do not process the original wind 
data separately for those factors. The indirect influence of those weather factors can be addressed 
through seasonal wind resource distribution that will be discussed in the next section. 
2.2 Energy Output Assessment for Wind Power Projects  
When the wind acts on the turbine, the kinetic power of the wind is firstly converted to the 
mechanical power, the rotational energy of the wind turbine rotor, and then converted to the 
electricity power through the generator in the wind turbine. Therefore, there are two main 
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components that determine the energy output from a wind project, one is the kinetic power of the 
wind, and the other is the efficiency of wind turbine design which transfers the kinetic power to 
the electricity power (Manwell, McGowan, and Rogers 2002).  
The kinetic power of the wind can be calculated through the physics formula (2-3), which 
basically provides the power of an air mass that flow at speed V through an area A (Burton et al. 






This is the total available energy coming to the turbine. However, the power in the wind cannot 
be extracted completely by the turbine, the capture of the wind will cause a reduction of speed in 
the air mass. The theoretical optimum for utilizing the power in the wind by reducing its velocity 
was first discovered by the German physicist Albert Betz in 1926. According to Betz’s Law, the 
theoretical maximum power that can be extracted from the wind should be discounted by a scale 
of around 0.59. Hence, even if power extraction without any losses were possible, only 59% of 
the wind power could be utilized by a wind turbine (Gasch and Twele 2012). Therefore, the 






Where 𝐶𝑝 is called power coefficient, which should be calculated by the feature of the air flow 
and the wind turbine. For simplicity, we assume 𝐶𝑝 to be 0.6 in our calculation. 
From (2-4), the energy output varies to the cube of the wind speed, which indicates that the 
volatility of the energy output is exaggerated accordingly. Therefore, in order to increase the 
prediction accuracy for the energy output of a wind project, one of the most important research 
and implication topics in the wind industry is how to better forecast the wind resource of a 
particular location. It is estimated that the cost due to wind energy prediction error have been as 
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much as 10% of total generator energy income, implying a strong need to manage the risks of 
unexpected levels of generation (Fabbri et al. 2005). 
Comparing with the weather factors mentioned in the last section, the relationship between the 
wind speed and the time is much more complicated and harder to predict. The wind resource are 
uncertain with time mainly associated with its intermittency nature due to the orographic 
conditions and global phenomena (Ackermann 2012). Furthermore, due to the high cost and 
deficiency of technologies, wind power, similar as other natural resources such as solar and hydro 
power, cannot be reasonably stored. Therefore in the energy industry, such renewable resources 
are called variable generations, and draws a lot attentions in the electricity market design field, 
especially with their higher penetration level to the conventional market (NERC 2010b). 
Although forecast techniques are significantly improving over the years, predicting wind’s output 
is much more difficult than predicting the output of conventional generators or load (Pérez-
Arriaga and Batlle 2012). The variability of wind speed differentiates with the timeframe they are 
evaluated, and various approaches are proposed to deal with each of them. Generally, only very 
near-term wind predictions are relatively accurate (Xie et al. 2011). In particular, it is estimated 
that the Mean Absolute Error (MAE), which measures the forecast error, for hour ahead 
forecasts can be about 5-7% of rated capacity; for day-ahead forecasts, the MAE could increases 
to the range of 12-25% (Milligan et al. 2009, NERC 2010b). 
In the literature, there are a number of methods been adopted and developed for wind speed 
forecasting. Generally, the methods can be classified into three categories, namely, physical 
models, statistical models, and time series models (Liu, Shi, and Erdem 2010). 
Physical models are often referred to as Numerical Weather Prediction (NWP) models, which use 
equations based on the fundamental principles of physics and simulates the state of atmosphere 
(Focken and Lange 2006). Since the model is not based on the historical data, but on the real time 
atmospheric conditions, the results can be relatively accurate (Giebel et al. 2006). And the model 
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could be especially useful in the real-time estimation, or very short time-scale forecast, such as 
second to minute analysis. On the other hand, these models were originally developed for general 
weather forecasting purposes (public safety, aviation, agriculture, etc.) rather than specifically for 
wind forecasting, hence the model itself is a large system and requires great computational efforts 
(NERC 2010b). 
There are many time series approaches proposed for modeling the dynamics of the wind speed 
processes (Alexandridis and Zapranis 2013). These models are more effective in the short to 
medium time-scale analysis, such as hour ahead forecasts. The general group of MA (moving 
average), AR (autoregressive), ARMA (autoregressive moving average), and ARIMA 
(autoregressive integrated moving average) models are the most common time series approaches 
used in the wind studies (Liu, Shi, and Erdem 2010). There have been a lot of studies on the use 
of linear ARMA models to simulate the short-term wind variations (Caporin and Preś 2012, 
Huang and Chalabi 1995, Billinton, Chen, and Ghajar 1996, Torres et al. 2005). Kavasseri et al. 
proposed a more sophisticated fractional integrated ARMA (f-ARIMA) model on the day-ahead 
(24 h) and two-day-ahead (48 h) horizons (Kavasseri and Seetharaman 2009). Ailliot et al. 
applied an autoregressive model (AR) with time-varying coefficients to describe the space-time 
evolution of wind fields (Ailliot, Monbet, and Prevosto 2006).  
Moreover, some non-conventional time series models such as NN (neural networks), SVM 
(support vector machines), and fuzzy logic have attracted enormous interests for wind speed 
forecasting due to their capability of implicitly establishing the complex non-linear relationship 
between variables (Kariniotakis, Stavrakakis, and Nogaret 1996, Pourmousavi Kani and Ardehali 
2011). Sfetsos conducted a comparison of various time series models on daily wind speed 
forecast, and found out that artificial intelligence based models outperformed the linear models, 
and a Neural Logic Network that incorporated Logic Rules realized the least error (Sfetsos 2000). 
Li et al. compared three types of typical neural networks, namely, adaptive linear element, back 
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propagation, and radial basis function, and concluded that the performance of the model is 
dependent upon the data sources, and for different models, the optimal solution can vary from 
each other, as much as 20% in terms of one particular evaluation metric (Li and Shi 2010). 
For medium to long timescale wind analysis, such as the monthly forecasting, the purpose is more 
focused on capturing the statistical trend of seasonal characteristics. There are several studies 
regarding the long-term (usually more than a year) variations of the wind resource, and it is found 
that the seasonal distribution of wind speed is significant (Petersen et al. 1998, Soder and Amelin 
2008).  For example in the Figure 2-2, the historic wind speed data is plotted on the daily base for 
the U.S. offshore Cape Wind project. As in this four year period (from 2009/03 to 2012/12), the 
wind speed almost follow the identical pattern within a year: the wind blow harder in autumn and 
winter, and is relatively calm in spring and summer. There are some even longer-term analysis 
estimated that the variation of the yearly mean power output from one 20-year period to the next 
has a standard deviation of 10% or less (Ackermann 2012). Hills compares the different natural 
sources and indicated that in many places, the uncertainty regarding the availability of water over 
a longer time period (more than one year) for hydropower generation exceeds that of wind power 
(Hills 1996). 
 
Figure 2-2 Seasonal Trend of Wind Speed Distribution of Cape Wind Project 
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Based on the abundant studies and numerical analysis on the long-term trend of wind speed, it is 
usually assumed that over the lifetime of a wind turbine (usually about 20 years), the uncertainty 
of the wind resource at a monthly base is not large (Ackermann 2012). It is because of this feature 
makes it possible and reasonable to use basic statistics distributions to depict the monthly wind 
resource, sometimes even applied on daily or hourly wind speed too (Daniel and Chen 1991, 
Garcia et al. 1998). Even though there is also much debate at present about the likely effects of 
global warming that could affect long-term wind climates trend in the coming decades, for 
simplicity, this dissertation will follow the conservative assumption that daily and monthly wind 
resource can be reasonably estimated by distributions regretted from the historic data (Burton et 
al. 2011, IPCC 2007, 2012). 
In literature and practice, there are two most commonly used distributions, namely the Rayleigh 
and the Weibull distribution, which are applied to estimate the wind speed. Figure 2-3 displays 
the typical pdf of Rayleigh distribution and Weibull distribution.  The Rayleigh distribution is the 
simplest speed probability distribution to represent the wind resource since it requires only a 
knowledge of the mean wind speed ?̅?. The Weibull distribution is based on two parameters, k (a 
shape factor) and c (a scale factor), both of with are function of the mean wind speed ?̅? and the 
standard deviation of wind speed 𝜎𝑉. Hence the Weibull distribution can better represent a wider 
variety of wind regimes (Manwell, McGowan, and Rogers 2002). Justus et al. first proposed to 
use the Weibull distribution to estimate wind speed, and apply it to the actual observed data. 
They concluded that Weibull distribution give smaller fitting errors than some other 
distributions and can be used to project wind speed at another height (Justus et al. 1978). 
Brown et al. put forward a general model applying these two non-Gaussian distribution, and 
simulate the hourly wind power for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
(Brown, Katz, and Murphy 1984). Although there are some other distribution proposed to deal 
with the wind speed, such as lognormal distribution (Garcia et al. 1998) or the Chi-square 
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distribution (Dorvlo 2002), Weibull distribution is widely accepted and utilized in the researches 
and empirical studies (Tuller and Brett 1984, Celik 2004, Jaramillo and Borja 2004). 
  
Figure 2-3 Rayleigh Distribution and Weibull Distribution with ?̅?=6m/s. Source: (Manwell, 
McGowan, and Rogers 2002) 
Figure 2-4 shows a typical wind speed probability density function shape, which deviates 
significantly from the normal and is not symmetrical (Alexandridis and Zapranis 2013). It is 
usually in the range from 0 to 30 m/s, and has positive skew with longer tail to the right.  
 
Figure 2-4 Wind Speed pdf for Cape Wind Project in October 
Given the wind power that acts on the wind turbine, there is another important issue that 
determines the energy output from the system, the efficiency of the power generation. Wind 
turbine does not generate electricity all the time, instead, the efficiency at different wind speeds 
varies significantly. Each individual wind turbine has a specification for the relationship of its 
power generation and corresponding wind speed, which is called the power curve. Figure 2-5 is 
the power curve of the offshore Cape Wind project turbines SWT-3.6-107, manufactured by 
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Siemens (Siemens 2011). Typically, the wind turbines start to generate electricity at the speed 
which is called the cut-in speed, ranging from 3-5 m/s, and stops production at the cut-out speed, 
ranging from 20-25 m/s. The most efficient range is from the cut-in speed to the rated speed, with 
which the power generation follow the cube relationship, as discussed in equation (2-4). Once 
reach the rated speed, the maximum power production will be limited, or, in other words, some 
parts of the available energy in the wind will be ‘spilled’ (Ackermann 2012). Typical rated power 
ranges from 12-16 m/s, and the power output at the rated speed is the wind turbine’s nameplate 
capacity, which is 3.6 MW for the Siemens turbine in the example (Figure 2-5).  
 
Figure 2-5 Power Curve for Wind Turbines of Cape Wind Project. Data source: (Siemens 2011). 
As discussed, the uncertainty of the power generation not only depends on the volatility of the 
wind, but also on the relationship between the wind and the specific turbines. One specific metric 
which is called Capacity Factor (CF) is then proposed to measure the performance of a specific 
wind turbine or multiple wind turbines as a project: 
𝐶𝐹 = 𝑃𝑤̅̅ ̅/𝑃𝑅 
The capacity factor of a wind turbine at a given site is defined as the ratio of the energy actually 
produced by the turbine to the energy that could have been produced if the machine ran at its 
rated power 𝑃𝑅, over a given time period (Manwell, McGowan, and Rogers 2002). 
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2.3 Evaluation for Project Revenue Risks  
In order to quantitatively evaluate the balance between the revenue and risks, a critical challenge 
is to identify a metric to measure the risks, in dollar value to be comparable to revenue.  
Typically in the domain of finance, the most classic approach for managing risks is the mean-
variance framework, with which the objective is to maximizing the expected risk premium per 
unit of risk (Markowitz 1952). Since then, the modern portfolio theory has been developed 
greatly and applied in various situations (Chopra and Ziemba 1993, Crama and Schyns 2003, 
Hirschberger, Qi, and Steuer 2007, Konno and Suzuki 1992). However, using the 
variance/standard deviation as the measure for risks implies that investors weight the probability 
of negative returns equally against positive returns (Campbell, Huisman, and Koedijk 2001). It 
may have a potential danger to sacrifice too much expected return in eliminating both high return 
extremes and low return extremes (Huang 2008, Markowitz 1952). 
Semi-variance and Value-at-Risk (VaR) were then proposed as alternatives for measuring the 
risks. Both approaches are able to measure the left-side tail for the return. Value-at-Risk (VaR), 
defined as the upper percentile (for instance, 95%) of the loss distribution, has been widely used 
as a simple and easy representation for high losses (Krokhmal, Palmquist, and Uryasev 2002, 
Jorion 1997). For example, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission have all converged on VaR as the 
benchmark risk measure to maintain the minimum level of capital as reserves against financial 
risks (Jorion 1997). 
However, one important drawback of VaR is that it is only efficient when the underlying risk 
factors are normally or log-normally distributed. Hence, most approaches to calculate VaR rely 
on linear approximation of the portfolio risks and assume normal or a joint normal (log-normal) 
distribution of the underlying market parameters (Simons 1996, Pritsker 1997, Duffie and Pan 
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1997). For non-normal distributions, VaR may have undesirable properties, such as lack of sub-
additivity and convexity, and incoherent.  
Therefore, as a more advanced alternative for risk measurement, Conditional Value-at-Risk 
(CVaR) was then proposed and is gaining its popularity. Although CVaR has not become a 
standard methodology in the finance industry, it has been proven to have better mathematical 
properties than VaR, such as transition equi-variant, positively homogeneous, convex, monotonic 
(Pflug 2000, Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000). Furthermore, with the technique proposed by 
(Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000) which calculates VaR and optimizes CVaR simultaneously 
taking into shape,  CVaR is ready to be combined with analytical or scenario-based methods to be 
applied in optimizing risk controls for all different industries (Krokhmal, Palmquist, and Uryasev 
2002). 
We will apply the concept of CVaR as the measure for risks throughout the whole dissertation, 
and the technique which defines a so-called F function will be utilized to mathematically 
transform the optimization problem to a solvable linear programming. Detailed definition for 
CVaR and the derivation for the F function are summarized in Appendix A. 
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Chapter 3.  Offtake Strategy for Wind Projects in Short-Term 
Power Wholesale Market 
3.1 Introduction 
With higher penetration of renewable energies, the structure of the power system is changed 
accordingly in terms of its supply-demand equilibrium and the allocations of different sources of 
power supplies. Hence the short-term power offtake strategy for renewable projects to be 
integrated into the existing power market needs to be scrutinized. 
In the U.S. deregulated power market, wind Independent Power Producer (IPPs) are treated as 
generating companies (GENCOs), and are obliged to follow the rules of the Day-Ahead (DA) 
forward market and the Real-Time (RT) balance market. Although there exist numerous research 
and mature decision systems for the traditional power plants to arrange their production and 
offtake plans (Carrión et al. 2007), the strategies need to be reconsidered and designed 
specifically for wind projects, due to their overarching attributes that are different from traditional 
power plants:  
1) Low Variable Cost 
Wind power has high up-front cost (investment cost) and fairly low variable cost. Because most 
of the variable cost come from annual fixed expenses, such as insurance and regular maintenance, 
the marginal running cost, which are usually fuel cost for traditional resources, are seen to be very 
low, even zero (Ackermann 2012).  
2) Uncontrollable Generation Quantity 
Sine wind power is a natural source, once a project is designed with a fixed structure and capacity, 
the power generation quantity is mostly dependent on the sufficiency of the wind energy. The 
magnitude and timing of variable generation output is less predictable than for conventional 
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generation (Ellis et al. 2012). The only controllable variable from the project owner side is the 
availability of the system, which is usually maintained as high as about 98% for offshore wind 
projects. 
3) Intermittent Nature 
Wind power is an intermittent energy source which is not easy to predict. The daily and hourly 
variations are significant, which introduces a high uncertainty in the availability of wind-
generated power even within relatively short time horizons (NERC 2010a). As a result, the 
energy output from the wind project fluctuates on all time scales (Ellis et al. 2012).  
For traditional power plants such as coal and nuclear plants, their strategies are to maximize the 
profit by making bidding plans for the generation amount and schedule based on their own 
manufacturing cost and estimation of the market supply-demand equilibrium. For wind IPPs, 
since all the generators are price-takers and they have very low generation cost, it becomes 
obvious that they will just try to sell as much as they generate at the given price. However, since 
the generation amount solely depends on the actual wind resource, the bidding strategy they make 
in the forward market could result in significantly high uncertainties when they realize the profit 
in the real-time market, together with the volatility of the electricity spot price. In practice, wind 
IPPs usually bid at the 50 percentile of their generation estimation for maximizing the expected 
profit. The failure to consider the possible risks and the corresponding probabilities is the main 
reason why the project developer cannot justify the sustainability, and why the investment parties 
are concerned that the current short-term strategy could undermine the overall project profitability. 
In this chapter, we will propose a general optimization model to design wind project bidding 
strategy under stochastic environment. A metric of Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) is 
proposed as the measure to the risks of project revenue. The project developer is expected to 
adjust their bidding strategies with uncertainties taken into consideration. Essentially, the 
uncertainties come from four parts: the uncertain wind resource, the uncertain electricity price, 
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the forecast error of wind resource, and the differences of electricity price between the day-ahead 
market and real-time market. 
3.2 Deregulated Power Market 
In April, 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) of the U.S. issued order 
No.888 and order no. 889, which were known as the deregulating or restructuring of US electric 
industry, which "promoting wholesale competition through open access non-discriminatory 
transmission services by public utilities" (FERC 1996a) and "establishing and governing an Open 
Access Same-time Information System (OASIS) (formerly real-time information networks) and 
prescribing standards of conduct" (FERC 1996b). Prior to the deregulation, the U.S. electricity 
market is a command-and-control industry. The energies are generated, transmitted and 
distributed by vertically integrated entities, who own and control the whole system subject to full 
regulation. Electricity consumers, on the other hand, had little or no choices regarding the sources 
of electricity they are buying. 
The deregulated market was established aiming to maintain a long-term consumer welfare, which 
relies on a complete competitive electricity wholesale market, providing a platform with 
competition to draw efficient investments in new generation and to better manage the operation 
capacity. Some basic economic efficiency criteria are proposed when the market was taking into 
shape, including “bid-based”, “security-constrained”, and “economic dispatch with nodal prices”  
(Hogan 1997). In order to meet the criteria, Independent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional 
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) were established to coordinate, control and monitor the 
operation of the regional electrical power system. Figure 3-1 is the map of nine North American 
ISOs/RTOs. All these ISOs and RTOs serve two-thirds of electricity consumers in the United 
States and more than 50 percent of Canada's population (Council 2011). Some of their operation 





Figure 3-1 Nine Major North American RTOs/ISOs (Council 2011). 
ISO/RTOs play important roles in the deregulated power market. As a matter of fact, without 
such independent entities as ISO/RTOs, the independent operation of the grid cannot be 
guaranteed. In the power market operation, ISO/RTOs are required to be working as independent 
middlemen between individual market participants, such as transmission companies 
(TRANSCOs), generation companies (GENCOs), distribution companies (DISCOs), and end-
users. In order to operate the competitive market efficiently while ensuring the reliability of a 
power system, the ISO/RTOs establish sound rules on energy and ancillary services markets, 
manage the transmission system in a fair and nondiscriminatory fashion, facilitate hedging tools 
against market risks, and monitor the market to ensure that it is free from market power (M. 
Shahidehpour 2002, Shahidehpour, Yamin, and Li 2002).  
GENCOs are entities that operate and maintain existing generating plants. They may own the 
generating plant or interact on behalf of plant owners with other entities. The GENCOs have the 
opportunity to sell electricity to the power market, from which large customers such as DISCOs 
and aggregators may purchase electricity to meet their needs. GENCOs may also opt to sell 
electricity to entities with whom they have negotiated bilateral power purchase contracts (M. 
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Shahidehpour 2002). In the electricity wholesale market, GENCOs are participating as electricity 
suppliers, selling their product to meet the demand from the buyers to realize the trading. Before 
the market deregulation, GENCOs typically shared the ownership or affiliation with other market 
participants, such as DISCOs (usually known as electricity utilities). While with the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct), and a series of orders issued in 1996 and 2000, the U.S. Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) mandated that utility-owned transmission systems be 
openly accessible to wholesale generators. Thereafter, Non-Utility Generator (NUGs), known as 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) grew dramatically (Zatzman 2012). The introduction of IPPs 
contributes greatly to the diversification of both the supply and nature of energy production, 
assists in the introduction of new skills and capital into the industry, and improves the 
benchmarking of performance and pricing (Eskom 2013). Although IPPs are typically smaller in 
size comparing with utility-owned GENCOs, they are specifically suitable types for developing 
renewable energy projects. In fact, the development of wind projects in the U.S. is predominantly 
driven by IPPs (Hahn and Gilman 2013).  
In order to design an efficient market to realize the reliability and the sustainability, theoretic 
models evolve quickly through the power market restructuring process, and two major market 
branches emerged and were implemented for various markets in the United States (Wilson 1999). 
One is the short-term wholesale market structure, sometimes is also called a PoolCo market, 
which is essentially built with a centralized pool where buyers and sellers are competing for the 
resources, and the power are produced and dispatched with a single (spot) price based on some 
economic rules (M. Shahidehpour 2002, Shahidehpour, Yamin, and Li 2002). The other one is a 
bilateral structure, where buyers and suppliers are negotiating and signing bilateral power 
purchase contract by themselves with desired contract terms. Both these two structures have their 
pros and cons, and there should be different strategies for IPPs to participate in different branches. 
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In this chapter, we will first discuss about the offtake strategy for wind projects in the short-term 
wholesale market, and the long-term bilateral relationship will be analyzed in the next chapter. 
3.3 Trading Scheme of the Short-term Power Wholesale Market  
Among the many economic tools for maintaining the competitive market and mitigating market 
power, such as monopoly and monopsony, is a two-settlement approach where day-ahead forward 
transactions, and real-time balancing transactions are settled sequentially at different prices. 
Hence there was established two markets constructing the short-term equilibrium, the Day-Ahead 
Forward Market (DA for the abbreviation), and the Real-Time Balancing Market (RT for the 
abbreviation). Figure 3-2 shows the decision process of the two markets.  
 
Figure 3-2 Decision Process of the DA and RT markets 
The DA market is a forward market for scheduling resources at each hour of the following day 
(M. Shahidehpour 2002, Shahidehpour, Yamin, and Li 2002). Buyers and suppliers offer and bid 
for the electricity, with the price and amount, based on their own strategy, and get virtually 
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dispatched based on ISO/RTOs’ decision about the clearing price (a single price for all 
participants in the same location for each hour) and respective amount for the specific hour. The 
dispatch schedule in the forward market are financially and physically binding, which means the 
scheduled suppliers must produce the committed quantity or, otherwise, buy power to balance 
their positions at the actual delivery time point. Likewise, wholesale buyers of electricity pay and 
lock in their rights to consume the quantities cleared at the forward prices.  
To ensure the reliability of power systems, the production and consumption of electric power 
must be balanced in real-time. However, real-time values of load, generation, and transmission 
system can differ from forward market schedules. Therefore, the real-time market is established 
to meet the balancing requirement, that’s why it is also called balancing market. In the real time, 
the imbalance, both for the supply and the demand side, will be reconciled based on the real-time 
equilibrium in terms of the RT clearing price, and the dispatch amount for each GENCOs. The 
ISO/RTOs act as important intermediates or facilitators between supply and demand in the 
balancing market. 
The two-settlement system is designed to recognize the critical characteristics of the power 
system, to operate the power system efficiently, and to utilize prices and associated incentives 
that are consistent with efficient operation (Hogan 2002). Theoretical analysis and empirical 
evidence suggests that forward trading reduces the incentives of sellers to manipulate spot market 
prices by reducing the vulnerability of seller’s profits to spot price fluctuations. Thus, forward 
market is viewed as an effective way of mitigating market power at real time (Kamat and Oren 
2004).  
There are numerous theoretical practical researches about electricity pricing. Given cost of all 
GENCOs on the network, demand and network topology, (Schweppe et al. 1988) originated the 
theory of competitive electricity locational spot prices using an optimal power flow model, with 
the objective of minimizing the total cost of generations. In the later studies, supply function 
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competition (Klemperer and Meyer 1989) and Cournot-Nash Equilibrium (Hashimoto 1985, 
Harker 1986) are two types of conjectural variations models used to represent energy markets. 
Green used supply function equilibrium to describe the electricity spot market in England and 
Wales soon after deregulation (Green 1999). He depict the situation when each firm submits a 
non-decreasing supply function specifying the quantity it is willing to provide at a given price, 
and solve the supply function equilibrium (SFE). Bolle considers the reaction of consumers to the 
average spot prices, and finds a continuum of equilibrium in all cases (Bolle 1992). He then 
extends the earlier research to consider command side bidding, and finds that increasing number 
of suppliers and demands results in more competitive behavior (Bolle 2001). Smeers and Wei 
assumes the market to be a Cournot competition and proposes a spatial oligopolistic electricity 
models to study the opportunity cost transmission prices (Smeers and Wei 1997). They further 
expanded their models to consider the regulated transmission prices and solve the Nash 
equilibrium by developing spatial models for the electricity market (Jing-Yuan and Smeers 1999). 
Hobbs assumes linear demand and cost functions, and establishes a mixed linear complementarity 
problem for solving Cournot market equilibrium in the bilateral and centralized PoolCo power 
market (Hobbs 2001).  
In a competition power market, it is usually assumed that sellers and buyers are very small 
compared to the market size, therefore, no participants can significantly affect the existing market 
price through their bidding behavior. In addition, each generation company plays a Nash game in 
the quantity they are bidding, which is equivalent to the situation where GENCOs are assuming 
that other firms will not alter their outputs — a Nash-Cournot game (Hobbs 2001). The bidding 
strategies then can be obtained by deriving first order of different GENCOs’ payoff function and 
market clearing conditions and solving them simultaneously. A solution satisfying these 
conditions will have the property that no participant will want to alter its decisions unilaterally, 
reaching a Nash equilibrium. Smeers concludes his survey of gas and electric market models by 
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arguing that explicit statement and solution of equilibrium conditions is a promising theoretical 
and computational approach to modeling strategic behavior (Smeers 1997).  
Given the information from all offerings and biddings, the spot price at which each participant 
can sell or buy electric power is essentially given by the equilibrium where supply meets demand, 
and ISO/RTOs are responsible for declaring and adjusting the price, as well as the dispatching 
schedule to maintain a fair and economically efficient market. In the day-ahead market, the price 
is calculated on an hourly interval, and is usually comprised of three parts: the energy price, the 
congestion cost, and marginal losses. Typically, the energy price remains the same in the whole 
power system, while the congestion price and marginal losses depend on the topology of the grid 
network, and constraints of the transmission capacity. The latter two are much smaller comparing 
with the energy price part. For simplification, we assume there is no congestion cost or marginal 
losses, hence the total price remains the same for all GENCOs in the system. The clearing price is 
called locational marginal pricing (LMP) or nodal pricing, and theoretically is the shadow price 
or dual price reflecting the increase of total cost of the market with relaxing one unit for each 
corresponding constraints for different participants (Litvinov 2011, Schweppe et al. 1988). In the 
scheme of LMP, generation is dispatched from the lowest bidding price, and then the next and so 
on until the supply and demand are met. In the Nash-Cournot equilibrium case, GENCOs usually 
assume that others will not alter their sales, hence they make their decisions based on their 
marginal generation cost. Therefore, the LMP scheme can be treated as the price discovery 
mechanism that the generation dispatch is in a merit order of cost of production, which first 
dispatches the generation from the least marginal cost GENCO, and then the next and so on.  
In practice, the LMP has been used in many deregulated markets, most notably in the east coast 
of the U.S. power market, such as the PJM Interconnection, New York, and New England 
markets. Figure 3-3 is an example of the supply and demand curve for a typical deregulated 
power market. Once the facility is built, the marginal cost of production mainly represents the 
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cost for fuel. Hence for wind and other renewable energies, the marginal cost of production can 
be regarded as very small, or even negative, if considering the credit or subsidies. Therefore, as 
shown, the bids from wind power and nuclear enter the supply curve at the lowest level owing to 
their low marginal cost, followed by CHP plants, while condensing plants and gas turbines are 
those with the highest marginal cost of power production (Ackermann 2012). In general, the 
demand for power is highly inelastic, which means the demand is not sensitive to the change of 
the supply. 
 
Figure 3-3 Supply and Demand Curve of a Deregulated Power Market. Adapted from 
(Ackermann 2012). 
In the DA market, bidding and offering are regarded as virtual trading, which helps buyers and 
suppliers to lock the price for the specific hour in the second day, and hedge the price volatility. 
While in the Real-Time market, the trading are real transactions and transmissions. GENCOs 
materially deliver the electricity they generate to the grid and distributors and utilities get the 
power from the grid. ISO/RTOs facilitate the real-time equilibrium, by updating the information 
from the actual supply and demand, sending price signals to both parties, and declare real time 
clearing prices. According to the hourly scheduled RT LMP, GENCOs get settled for their RT 
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generations. For a well-organized power market with no market power, the RT LMP should not 
deviate too much from the DA forward LMP. Figure 3-4 is a typical plot for DA LMP and RT 
LMP from PJM’s market report (PJM 2012). As shown, RT LMP is greater than DA LMP for 
about 12 hours out of 24 hours in a day. 
 
Figure 3-4 RT LMP and DA LMP for a typical day in PJM market (PJM 2012). 
The RT balancing market is a flexible mechanism that helps to adjust the imbalance supply and 
demand from the forward market. Here are some examples of how it works:  
If the RT supply is larger than the RT demand, then the RT LMP will be larger than the DA LMP. 
This is an incentive for GENCOs to increase their generation capacity to meet the demand, 
because the marginal cost is less than the marginal profit, assuming in the forward market, 
GENCOs are bidding at their marginal cost. 
Similarly, if the RT supply is less than the RT demand, then the RT LMP will be less than the DA 
LMP. In this case, the GENCO that is with the highest marginal cost will have the incentive to 
reduce its generation, since the penalty of not fulfilling the bidding amount will be less than the 
saving from reducing the generation. 
If supply and demand remain the same, but some of the GENCOs cannot fulfill the obligation, 
then there will be additional supply requirement from other GENCOs. Then the RT LMP, which 
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is the marginal cost of the additional supply is expected to be larger than the DA LMP. The DA 
LMP is settled as penalties for the GENCOs that fail to meet promise, and is larger than marginal 
cost for those GENCOs.  
Same situation happen to the GENCOs when they generate more than they bid, then there is extra 
supply than demand, causing the RT LMP decreasing, then there will be a lost accordingly. In 
these two cases, there is no incentive for GENCOs to unilaterally change their generation unless 
they have to. 
All these rules apply to the wind IPPs, but it is more complicated because they have no control 
over their generation. Once they bid in the forward market, their real time settlement will be 
purely dependent on the actual wind resource. Their strategies, unlike other traditional GENCOs, 
will be to decide how much they bid in the DA market, based on their forecast, instead of their 
actually generation. Detailed decision making process will be discussed in the following part.  
3.4 Offtake Strategy in the Energy Wholesale Market for Wind Projects 
We now consider the situation where the wind IPP sells all its power generation to the energy 
spot market. Consider a typical U.S. power market with the PoolCo, the procedures for the wind 
IPP to sell its electricity are: 
1) Bid in the day-ahead (DA) market for both the quantity and price of each hour for the next 
day 
2) Be informed of the DA schedule, taking the DA locational marginal pricing (clearing LMPs) 
3) In the real-time (RT) balancing market, get paid DA LMPs for DA scheduled generation  
4) Get paid at RT LMPs for any generation that exceeds the day-ahead scheduled quantities, 
while will pay for generation deviations below the scheduled quantities. 
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3.4.1 Nash-Cournot Equilibrium in the Day-Ahead Forward Market 
In the day-ahead market, assume all GENCOs are participating and bidding based on their own 
profit maximization, the DA clearing price, a.k.a the DA LMP will be decided based on the 
equilibrium of the supply curve and the demand forecast, therefore, the amount get dispatched in 
the DA market will be decided on the aggregation of all biddings from the GENCOs.  
We consider a simplified case, when there are only two GENCOs in the market, one is the wind 
project, and the other one is a traditional power plant, their dispatched amount is 𝑞1  and 𝑞2 . 
Assume the demand is a linear function of the total supply amount, then 𝑝 = 𝛼 − 𝛽 ∙ (𝑞1 + 𝑞2). 
The market follows a Cournot duopoly competition. The equilibrium will be reached when the 
two players follow their own profit maximization strategy. 
For the wind project, since the variable cost can be assumed to be a small constant, the hourly 
bidding strategy can be expressed as:  
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛱1 = [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2)] ∙ 𝑞1 − 𝐶 (3-1) 
 
𝑠. 𝑡.                                         
 
 
0 ≤ 𝑞1 ≤ 𝑄1 
 
Where 𝑞1is the decision variable, and 𝑄1 represents the forecast mean of the generation amount 
for the certain hour. We follow the ISO/RTOs’ rules that wind project cannot bid more than the 
forecasted mean the DA market.  
Similarly, for the traditional power plant, the problem is also to maximize its profit, only 
difference is that it has a generation cost, which usually can be assumed as a linear function to the 
generation amount γ ∙ 𝑞2. Therefore, the problem can be written as: 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛱2 = [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2)] ∙ 𝑞2 − 𝛾 ∙ 𝑞2 (3-2) 
 s. t.                                                 
 0 ≤ 𝑞2 ≤ 𝑄2  
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Here 𝑄2 represents the possible maximum generation capacity of the plant, it can chose to bid up 
to that amount in the DA market. Solving the problem for the two players, we can have some 
observations. 
With individual optimization models built, we can combine the two problems, and solve the 
equilibrium for the market. The nonlinear program can be transferred into a nonlinear 
complementarity problem via its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (Gabriel, Kiet, and 
Zhuang 2005). Therefore, we use complementarity method to solve this problem after proving its 
optimality sufficient by KKT conditions.  
Let 𝑢11 and 𝑢12 be the Lagrangian multipliers for problem (3-1) constraints, and 𝑢21 and 𝑢22 for 
problem (3-2) .Then KKT conditions for the two problems, can be written as (Gabriel, Kiet, and 
Zhuang 2005): 
 2𝛽𝑞1 + 𝛽𝑞2 − 𝛼 − 𝑢11 + 𝑢12 = 0 (3-3) 
0 ≤ 𝑢11  ⊥ 𝑞1 ≥ 0  
0 ≤ 𝑢12  ⊥ 𝑄1 − 𝑞1 ≥ 0  
 2𝛽𝑞2 + 𝛽𝑞1 − 𝛼 + 𝛾 − 𝑢21 + 𝑢22 = 0 (3-4) 
0 ≤ 𝑢21  ⊥ 𝑞2 ≥ 0  
0 ≤ 𝑢22  ⊥ 𝑄2 − 𝑞2 ≥ 0  































2𝛽𝑞1 + 𝛽𝑞2 − 𝛼 − 𝑢11 + 𝑢12
𝑞1
𝑄1 − 𝑞1
2𝛽𝑞2 + 𝛽𝑞1 − 𝛼 + 𝛾 − 𝑢21 + 𝑢22
𝑞2




≥ 0 (3-5) 
Solving the problem by assuming different parameters for 𝑄1, 𝑄2, 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾, we can get the 
solutions for different situations and sensitivity analysis:  
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Table 3-1 Solution for NCP model and Sensitivity Analysis 

























15 500 250 0.2 100 15 367.5 383 174 36750 2603 27011 
50 500 250 0.2 100 50 350 400 170 35000 8500 24500 
70 500 250 0.2 100 70 340 410 168 34000 11760 23120 
110 500 250 0.2 100 110 320 430 164 32000 18040 20480 
50 500 250 0.2 50 50 475 525 145 23750 7250 45125 
50 500 250 0.2 100 50 350 400 170 35000 8500 24500 
50 500 250 0.2 150 50 225 275 195 33750 9750 10125 
50 500 200 0.2 100 50 225 275 145 22500 7250 10125 
50 500 250 0.2 100 50 350 400 170 35000 8500 24500 
50 500 300 0.2 100 50 475 525 195 47500 9750 45125 
 
From the simple numerical solution, and the sensitivity analysis, we can observe that the wind 
project will always be dispatched to the upper bound that it is allowed to bid, due to its zero cost 
for power generation.  
The sensitivity analysis checks the impact of the penetration level to the market, which is defined 
as following: 
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 =
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
 






) = (2.9%, 18%), from low level to 
high level of penetration. The higher the penetration level is, the less power the traditional plant 
will be dispatched, and the clearing price for the day-ahead market will be reduced accordingly. 
The influence of the wind project to the existing market can be illustrated through the following 
Figure 3-5, where the power market is relaxed to a more general situation which include all 
different kinds of power plants. With additional power resources from wind, which has very low 
generation cost, all the existing supply curve (dotted curve) will be moved towards right (solid 
curve), which means some higher-cost power plant will lose some demand accordingly. The 




Figure 3-5 New Balance of Supply and Demand for the Power Market with Wind Resource. 
Adapted from (Ackermann 2012) 
The change of the demand curve can be regarded as demand for different time period during the 
day. Since the power generated by the wind project and other intermittent renewables are always 
first dispatched, the change of the market demand will only affect the generation dispatch of the 
traditional plants. However, the market clearing price is changed accordingly, which will 
influence the revenue for the wind project. 
Another important observation is that no matter how much the wind IPPs bid in the market, all 
the bidding amount will be dispatched. This phenomenon can be easily explained as follows: 
since the marginal cost of wind project can be regarded as zero, the wind IPPs will always bid at 
zero to maximize their profit, while all other GENCOs are bidding at their marginal cost, which 
are larger than zero. With a relatively low penetration of wind, the demand will be firstly met by 
wind, and then other resources, according to the merit-order. In the end, the market clearing price 
will be strictly positive, and all electricity generated from wind resource will be dispatched.  
3.4.2 Revenue Optimization in the Real-Time Balancing Market 
After all the bidding amount and the DA clearing price declared in the Day-Ahead forward 
market, all GENCOs are delivering their generation and realizing their profit in the Real-Time 
balancing market. If there is an imbalance between the generation and the real demand, 
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ISO/RTOs will search for a new equilibrium based on the real-time demand signals and the day-
ahead supply curve. Meanwhile, GENCOs will keep eyes on their actual generation situations and 
communicate with ISO/RTOs through amount and price signals. A Real-Time Price will be 
declared at a 5-min interval1 based on the updated balance, and for GENCOs, the imbalance 
between the real-time delivery and the day-ahead dispatch schedule will be settled based on the 
RT price at an hourly basis. 
With this procedure, the only decision the wind IPP should make is the generation amount to bid 
in the DA market 𝑄𝐷𝐴 for every hour. In the traditional bidding strategies, profitability remains 
the prior objective. Advances have been achieved in the literatures proposing methodologies 
aiming to improve the expected profit. Since the fundamental problems wind IPPs are facing is 
the uncontrollable and unpredictability of wind resource, over the last decades numerous 
researches have been proposed in the meteorology and physical domain focused on how to better 
forecast the available wind resource (Wu and Hong 2007, Costa et al. 2008). While forecasting 
still will never give perfect results, especially over a longer time interval (e.g. daily), another 
direction is to mathematically design the strategy considering different market mechanisms 
through stochastic optimization frameworks (Matevosyan and Soder 2006, Rahimiyan, Morales, 
and Conejo 2011). The fundamental concept of this framework is to treat the uncertainty of the 
wind resource by considering possible scenarios (Bathurst, Weatherill, and Strbac 2002) or 
sampling from the probability distributions (Pinson, Chevallier, and Kariniotakis 2007). In this 
research, the idea is followed, and the stochastic optimization model is studied further to be 
integrated with another evaluation metric measuring the project revenue risks. 
Different with traditional power generators, the variability and uncontrollability of the wind 
resource, together with the volatile electricity price, could cause a high volatility for the project 
future revenue stream. Sometimes the variance could be very high when the wind is not blowing 
                                                          
1 Typical update interval are 5 minutes in US ISO/RTOs. There are also 10 or 20 minutes in other areas. 
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or there is a sudden gust causing the system to shut down. If the project is simply following the 
strategy to maximize the expected profit, it could be subject to an extensive loss for some events 
with low probability. As a matter of fact, the potential volatility of the cash flow has become one 
of the key problems preventing wind projects to participate in the merchandise wholesale market. 
A specific mechanism for project risk management should be incorporated when planning the 
offtakes. Therefore, another important metric of evaluating the offtake strategy for wind projects 
is the stability of the future revenue. The control of the revenue risk is a guarantee for a stable 
future revenue stream thus can largely increase the possibilities of the projects’ success.  
There are limited literatures measuring risks associated with short-term offtake of wind projects. 
Galloway followed the classic risk assessment method, the mean variance, and specifically 
combine it with the use of utility functions (Galloway et al. 2006). Morales and Conejo et al. 
proposed the conditional value at risk (CVaR) due to its good mathematical properties when 
incorporated with a linear programming (Morales, Conejo, and Pérez-Ruiz 2010). CVaR, as we 
discussed in the last chapter, has favorable characteristics especially when it is applied to the non-
normal (or non-log normal) parameters (Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000). In this paper, we will 
follow the latter approach and apply the CVaR measuring the hourly revenue risk. 
We now build the optimization model for wind IPP with the revenue and CVaR calculated on an 
hourly bases. Since the decision making is made in a stochastic environment, the objective is to 
maximize the expected value of the hourly revenues, and we add a constraint of revenue risk, 
measured using CVaR. Meanwhile, the bidding amount cannot exceed the expected generation 
amount. Hence, the problem of optimizing bidding strategy can be written as: 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸[ 𝑅(𝑄𝐷𝐴, 𝑄𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝐷𝐴, 𝑃𝑅𝑇)] (3-6) 
𝑠. 𝑡.                                
𝜙𝛽(𝑄𝐷𝐴) ≤ 𝑤 
0 ≤ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 ≤ 𝐸[𝑄𝑅𝑇] 
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Where 𝑅(𝑄𝐷𝐴, 𝑄𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝐷𝐴, 𝑃𝑅𝑇) is the hourly return, with 𝑄𝐷𝐴 as the decision variable, 𝜙𝛽(𝑄𝐷𝐴) is 
the 𝛽-level CVaR for 𝑄𝐷𝐴, and 𝑤 is the tolerance level for the risk. 
It is proved by (Krokhmal, Palmquist, and Uryasev 2002) that this optimization problem have the 
equivalent formulations to the following problem, if the 𝑅(𝑄𝐷𝐴, 𝑄𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝐷𝐴, 𝑃𝑅𝑇) is concave, and 
𝜙𝛽(𝑄𝐷𝐴) and the set 𝑄𝐷𝐴 are both convex: 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜙𝛽(𝑄𝐷𝐴) − 𝜇𝐸[ 𝑅(𝑄𝐷𝐴, 𝑄𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝐷𝐴, 𝑃𝑅𝑇)] (3-7) 
 𝑠. 𝑡.                                                        
0 ≤ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 ≤ 𝐸[𝑄𝑅𝑇] 
As discussed in the last session for the two-settlement market, no matter how much the wind IPP 
bid in the DA and the RT market can be totally dispatched. And the only decision the wind IPP 
should make is the generation amount to bid in the DA market 𝑄𝐷𝐴 for every hour, whatever is 
the imbalance of the actual generation will be settled in the RT market, the hourly revenue 
𝑅(𝑄𝐷𝐴, 𝑄𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝐷𝐴, 𝑃𝑅𝑇) can be written as: 
 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑃𝐷𝐴 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 + 𝑃𝑅𝑇 ∙ (𝑄𝑅𝑇 − 𝑄𝐷𝐴)  (3-8) 
 = 𝑃𝐷𝐴 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 + (𝑃𝐷𝐴 + ∆𝑃) ∙ (𝑄𝑅𝑇 − 𝑄𝐷𝐴)   
 = 𝑃𝐷𝐴 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 + 𝑃𝐷𝐴 ∙ 𝑄𝑅𝑇 − 𝑃𝐷𝐴 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 + ∆𝑃 ∙ (𝑄𝑅𝑇 − 𝑄𝐷𝐴)   
 = 𝑃𝐷𝐴 ∙ 𝑄𝑅𝑇 + ∆𝑃 ∙ ∆𝑄   
Where: 
𝑃𝐷𝐴 − Day Ahead Clearing Price 
𝑄𝐷𝐴 − Day Ahead Bidding Amount, Decision Variable 
𝑃𝑅𝑇 − Real Time Clearing Price 
𝑄𝑅𝑇 − Real Time Generation Amount 
∆𝑃 − Difference between Real Time Clearing Price and Day Ahead Clearing Price 
∆𝑄 − Difference between Real Time Generation and Day Ahead Bidding Amount 
 
47 
Usually, the Day-ahead market price is decided by the market equilibrium, and not influenced by 
each GENCO, hence 𝑃𝐷𝐴 and 𝑄𝑅𝑇 can be regarded as independent. Meanwhile, the difference of 
the market price are based on the market situation, while the forecasting error of the power 
generation is only related to individual power producer’s judgment and natural resource 
turbulence, hence ∆𝑃 and ∆𝑄 can also be assumed to be independent. The expected value for the 
hourly revenue for the wind project is: 
𝐸[ 𝑅(𝑄𝐷𝐴, 𝑄𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝐷𝐴, 𝑃𝑅𝑇)] = 𝐸[𝑃𝐷𝐴] ∙ 𝐸[𝑄𝑅𝑇] + 𝐸[∆𝑃] ∙ 𝐸[∆𝑄] 
On the other hand, the CVaR risk function 𝜙𝛽(𝑄𝐷𝐴), by definition, measures the conditional 
expectation of the hourly loss (negative revenue) associated with 𝑄𝐷𝐴 relative to that loss being 
𝛼𝛽(𝑄𝐷𝐴) or larger. Therefore it can be written as: 
 𝜙𝛽(𝑄𝐷𝐴) = (1 − 𝛽)
−1 ×  (3-9) 
∭ −𝑅(𝑄𝐷𝐴, 𝑄𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝐷𝐴, 𝑃𝑅𝑇)𝑝(𝑄𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝐷𝐴, 𝑃𝑅𝑇)𝑑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑑𝑃𝐷𝐴𝑑𝑃𝑅𝑇
−𝑅(𝑄𝐷𝐴,𝑄𝑅𝑇 ,𝑃𝐷𝐴,𝑃𝑅𝑇)≥𝛼𝛽(𝑄𝐷𝐴)
 
Where 𝛼𝛽(𝑥) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝛼 ∈ ℝ:𝛹(𝑥, 𝛼) ≥ 𝛽), which is usually referred to as the Value-at-Risk 
(VaR), defined as the left endpoint of the nonempty interval consisting of the values 𝛼 such that 
𝛹(𝑥, 𝛼) = 𝛽. With 𝑅(𝑄𝐷𝐴, 𝑄𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝐷𝐴, 𝑃𝑅𝑇) = 𝑃𝐷𝐴 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 + 𝑃𝑅𝑇 ∙ (𝑄𝑅𝑇 − 𝑄𝐷𝐴), then 
 𝜙𝛽(𝑄𝐷𝐴)  (3-10) 
= ∭ [−𝑃𝐷𝐴 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 − 𝑃𝑅𝑇 ∙ 𝑄𝑅𝑇 + 𝑃𝑅𝑇 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴]
−𝑅(𝑄𝐷𝐴,𝑄𝑅𝑇 ,𝑃𝐷𝐴,𝑃𝑅𝑇)≥𝛼𝛽(𝑄𝐷𝐴)
∙ 𝑝(𝑄𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝐷𝐴, 𝑃𝑅𝑇)𝑑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑑𝑃𝐷𝐴𝑑𝑃𝑅𝑇 
The bidding strategy is related to the exogenous parameters of the market and the wind resource. 
If the parameters are deterministic, the bidding strategy of every hour can be easily solved. If the 
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parameters are stochastic, then the bidding strategy can be solved through sampling multiple 
times from the distribution or historical data. 
3.4.3 Model Solvability 
In order to deal with the troublesome mathematical properties of the 𝛽-CVaR, (Rockafellar and 
Uryasev 2000) proposed a methodology by defining a simpler expression 𝐹𝛽(𝑥, 𝛼)  with its 
convexity in the variable α, and it is proved later by (Krokhmal, Palmquist, and Uryasev 2002) 
that instead of determining a vector 𝑥 that yields the minimization for the combination of 𝛽-
CVaR and the expected profit, one can equivalently minimize the combination of 𝐹𝛽(𝑥, 𝛼) and 
the expected profit. 
Applying this methodology, we define the F functions of the CVaR problems as follows: 
𝐹𝛽(𝑄𝐷𝐴, 𝛼) = 𝛼 + (1 − 𝛽)
−1 (3-11) 
× ∭ [−𝑃𝐷𝐴 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 − 𝑃𝑅𝑇 ∙ 𝑄𝑅𝑇 + 𝑃𝑅𝑇 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 − 𝛼]





𝑡      𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑡 > 0,
0      𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑡 ≤ 0.
 
In the problem (4-21), if the parameters of 𝑄𝑅𝑇, 𝑃𝐷𝐴, and 𝑃𝑅𝑇 are known as deterministic, then 
𝐹𝛽(𝑄𝐷𝐴, 𝛼)  is convex and continuously differentiable as a function of 𝛼 , hence the bidding 
strategy 𝑄𝐷𝐴 can be solved directly by taking derivative of 𝛼 and let it to be zero. However, there 
is no chance the parameters are deterministic when the bidding is made, then some sampling 
process should be taken in terms of each parameters based on their known distributions, or from 
historic data. In this problem, the sampling process will generate three series of vectors 
𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑘 , 𝑃𝐷𝐴𝑘 , 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑘 , (𝑘 = 1,⋯𝑀) respectively from the distribution of actual electricity generation, 
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day-ahead market price, and real-time market price, then the corresponding approximation to 
𝐹𝛽(𝑄𝐷𝐴, 𝛼)  is: 
𝐹?̃?(𝑄𝐷𝐴, 𝛼) = 𝛼 +
1
𝑀(1 − 𝛽)





Although this expression is not differentiable to 𝛼, it is convex and piecewise linear with respect 
to 𝛼. Hence it can readily be minimized, either by line search techniques or by representation in 
terms of an elementary linear programming problem (Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000). 












∙ [∑(𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑘 − 𝑃𝐷𝐴𝑘)
𝑀
𝑘=1
∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴] − 𝜇𝐸[(𝑃𝑅𝑇 ∙ 𝑄𝑅𝑇)] 
(3-13) 
We further define another series of auxiliary real variables, 𝑢𝑘, 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑀 , to replace the 
maximization function [𝑡]+, and add corresponding constraints. Therefore, the problem of (3-7) is 










∙ [∑(𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑘 − 𝑃𝐷𝐴𝑘)
𝑀
𝑘=1
∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴] − 𝜇𝐸[(𝑃𝑅𝑇 ∙ 𝑄𝑅𝑇)] (3-14) 
𝑠. 𝑡.                                                                          
(𝑃𝐷𝐴𝑘 − 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑘) ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 + 𝛼 + 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑘 ∙ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑘 + 𝑢𝑘 ≥ 0, 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑀 
𝑢𝑘 ≥ 0, 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑀  
0 ≤ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 ≤ 𝐸[𝑄𝑅𝑇] 
Where 𝑄𝐷𝐴 and 𝛼 are decision variables, and 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑘, 𝑃𝐷𝐴𝑘, and 𝑄𝑅𝑇 are all stochastic variables.  
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With all the above mathematical techniques, the complicated stochastic problem is translated into 
a linear programming. Although the problem size depends on the specific M, the problem 
formulation is readily solvable using commercially available software. 
3.5 Case Study for Cape Wind Project 
3.5.1 Overview of Cape Wind Project 
Cape Wind project, proposed on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) offshore, Massachusetts, is 
the first offshore wind project that has been approved in the U.S. coastal waters. The project area 
is located in Federal waters between Cape Cod, Martha’s Vineyard, and Nantucket Island (Figure 
3-6). As an IPP, the project developer Cape Wind Associates, LLC (CWA) plans to construct and 
operate 130, 3.6 megawatt (MW) wind turbine generators, each with a maximum blade height of 
440 feet (80m), on Horseshoe Shoal in Nantucket Sound (Figure 3-7). The facility’s total 
nameplate capacity will be 468 MWs, and with an average anticipated output of 183 MW, it will 
supply up to 75% of the electricity needs of Cape Cod and the Islands of Martha’s Vineyard and 
Nantucket. 
 




Figure 3-7 Location and Turbine Array for Cape Wind Energy Project. Source: BOEM. 
The Cape Wind project is now undergoing the project financing phase, with two PPA contract 
already signed and approved, covering 77.5% of the total project capacity. Meanwhile, the 
remaining part of the project, 22.5%, will be sold through the spot market which is in the 
operation area of New England ISO. The time frame of the project is shown in the Figure 3-8. 
 
Figure 3-8 Timeline for Cape Wind Project 
3.5.2 Data Collection of Cape Wind Project 
Out-of-sample analysis, which essentially uses one data set to derive decisions and another data 
set to test the efficaciousness of the decision on actual operation, is going to be the method we 
use for the case study. For the Cape Wind project, the data for year 2009 to 2012 are set as the 
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sample, and the decisions made from those data are applied for year 2013 actual data to test the 
performance. Specifically, the following data sources are identified: 
1.  Wind resource for the project location: 
There is a meteorology station located very close to the project site. Historical and real-time data 
for wind speed and wind direction is available from the National Data Buoy Center online 
database (NOAA 2013), from March 2009 until present, at a 15-min interval. The data is captured 
by a buoy as shown in the Figure 3-9 from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) system. Since the buoy is at the sea level, while the wind turbine for the project is at the 
height of 80m, wind speed will be modified according to the vertical wind profile reviewed in the 
Chapter 2. As also reviewed in the literatures, the wind speed doesn’t fluctuate violently in a 
long-term time frame, hence the data from more than four years will be sufficient to estimate the 
monthly wind resource distribution. 
  
 
Figure 3-9 NOAA Buoy Station 44020 at Nantucket Sound (NOAA 2013). 
Due to the seasonality at the long-term scale and turbulence at the short-term scale for wind data, 
detailed statistic regression procedure are designed. Specifically, for each hour, a window for plus 
and minus one hour, and plus and minus fifteen days of each of the three years is applied to regret 
the wind speed Weibull distribution,  
2. Technical Data for the Wind Turbine 
This project is going to build 130 wind turbines that are manufactured by Siemens, each with 3.6 
megawatt (MW) nameplate capacity. All the technical specifications for the turbine SWT-3.6-107 
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are available from Siemen’s brochure. In particular, the most important information are listed in 
Table 3-2: 
Table 3-2 Specifications for Siemens Wind Turbine SWT-3.6-107. Data source: (Siemens 2011) 
Hub Height 80 m Nominal Power 3,600 kW 
Rotor Diameter 107 m Voltage 690 V 
Swept Area 9000 m2 Cut-in Speed 3-5 m/s 
Power Regulation 
Pitch Regulation 
with Variable Speed 
Nominal Power 13-14 m/s 
Blade Length 52 m Cut-out Speed 25 m/s 
 
Meanwhile, the power curve is also provided as Figure 3-10, with which the power generation 
and corresponding efficiency from the wind turbines can be estimated more accurately. 
 
Figure 3-10 Power Curve for Wind Turbines of Cape Wind Project. Data source: (Siemens 2011). 
3. Market information of electricity price  
The project is located in the operation area of New England ISO, which is one of the nine major 
North American RTOs/ISOs, as discussed in section 3.2. As regulated by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), New England ISO keeps very detailed database records of the 
electricity market information on its website, such as the hourly DA and RT LMP, starting from 
March, 2003 (NEISO 2013). These information are critical in evaluating the market value of the 
project production, and will be treated as the input of the sampling seeds for real-time electricity 
price forecast. In the next two chapters, the market information will also be used as the base to 
estimate future electricity price, hence evaluate the project revenue stream. 
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Similarly, we use three years of DA/RT LMP data (year 2009-2012) to conduct the forecasting 
and apply it to the year 2013 for the verification. Specifically, a window for plus and minus one 
hour, and plus and minus fifteen days of each of the three years is applied to regret the normal 
distribution for the hourly DA and RT price.  
With the above information available, this project is expected to be a perfect case study for this 
dissertation to analyze and compare throughout different strategies.   
3.5.3 Sampling Seeds and Seasonal Trend 
Regretted from the three-year data, the parameters for hourly wind speed, the DA price and RT 
price can be estimated respectively. The following three figures (Figure 3-11 to Figure 3-13) plot 
the regretted mean and standard deviation of these three parameters for each hour (altogether 
8760 hours) in year 2013.  
 




Figure 3-12 Regression Result for Hourly DA Electricity Price, year 2013 
 
Figure 3-13 Regression Result for Hourly RT Electricity Price, year 2013 
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As shown in the result, all the three parameters have high volatility at the hourly base. The 
normalized standard deviation, defined as 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛
,  respectively range from 35%-65% 
(for wind speed), 8%-47% (for DA electricity price) and 10%-50% (for RT electricity price).  
A strong seasonal trend can also be observed from the results, both for the means and standard 
deviations. While wind resource shows a larger various during fall and spring, and smaller 
volatility during winter and summer, the trend for electricity price is on the opposite direction. 
This phenomenon is helpful in eliminating some of the integrated volatilities. But due that the 
value of the profit 𝑃𝐷𝐴 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 + 𝑃𝑅𝑇 ∙ (𝑄𝑅𝑇 −𝑄𝐷𝐴)  is dependent on the absolute value of the 
parameters, the trend of the electricity price still dominants. Hence it is expected that the project 
revenue cash flow will have higher uncertainties during summer and winter, and the bidding 
strategy will also be expected to show some related seasonal trend. 
3.5.4 Bidding Strategy and Risk Attitude 




[0,1] for the conflicted objectives. The smaller the 𝜆, the larger the 𝜇 is, thus the more weights are 
allocated to the risk control, and the more risk averse the wind IPP is. Specifically for the first 
hour of Jan.1st, we run the model with 𝜆 changing from 0 to 1, with incremental step=0.001, the 




Figure 3-14 Hourly 𝛽-CVaR of Revenue with Different Weight (hour 1) 
 
Figure 3-15 Expected Hourly Revenue with Different Weight (hour 1) 
It can be observed that the expected hourly revenue of the project decreases when 𝜆 is getting 
larger, while maintain within a steady range when 𝜆 reaches around 0.2. Similarly, the hourly 
CVaR is increasing dramatically with 𝜆, and stays as zero after 𝜆  is more than 0.2. Therefore, the 
inflection point  𝜆 = 0.2, making 𝜇 = 4, could be regarded as a reasonable weight to balance the 
conflicted objectives. A detailed efficiency frontier can be derived with combination of the CVaR 
and profit at each 𝜇. 
Sampling from the three stochastic parameters, the linear programming (3-14) is applied to deal 
with the short-term offtake strategy for Cape Wind project for year 2013. The bidding amount for 
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each hour is then solved. Meanwhile, different risk attitudes in terms of the confidence level 𝛽, 
are applied. The higher the 𝛽 means the more risk averse the wind IPP is. For example, 𝛽 = 0.95 
means the wind IPP is trying to minimize the losses that is more than the 95% percentile, thus 
less risk is taken for the extreme cases.  
The bidding strategies with different risk confidence levels 𝛽 are shown in the Figure 3-16 - 
Figure 3-18. It is worth noticing that the bidding amount showing in the figure is for each wind 
turbine. Since we don’t consider the wake effect between wind turbines, the hourly bidding 
amount for the whole project can be simply calculated by multiplying the number of facilities, 
130. 
According to the results, the seasonal trend is obvious that wind IPP is willing to bid more in the 
DA market during fall and spring, when the volatility of the trading environment is relatively low 
comparing with summer and winter, as discussed above.  
 
Figure 3-16 Hourly Bidding Strategy with 𝛽 = 0.95, year 2013 
 




Figure 3-18 Hourly Bidding Strategy with 𝛽 = 0.85, year 2013 
It can also be observed that the more risk averse (higher confidence level 𝛽), the less the wind 
IPP is intended to bid in the DA market, and settle more of the offtake in the RT market. In order 
to verify this phenomenon, we now illustrate the relationship between the confidence level 𝛽, 
hourly revenue and cash flow risk CVaR. Specifically for the first hour of Jan.1st, we run the 
program by changing the 𝛽 levels from 0.5 to 1. The corresponding bidding strategy, hourly 
revenue and hourly CVaR of the project can be calculated, as shown in Figure 3-19 and Figure 
3-20. 
 




Figure 3-20 Hourly Revenue with Regard to Confidence Level 𝛽 (hour 1) 
With 𝛽 increases from 0.5 to 1, the bidding amount of the project in the DA market decreases 
dramatically from the ceiling for the bidding to zero. The revenue risk is controlled more strictly, 
with the expected 𝛽 -level-losses changing from around $4,000 to zero, while the expected 
revenue is also decreasing accordingly, from around $11,400 to $10,900. This can be understood 
as a trade-off between the profit and the risks. Risk-taking IPPs tend to take the opportunity of the 
uncertainty, hoping to make money from the market volatility, while risk-averse IPPs are more 
willing to sacrifice the potential profit and control the possible losses.  
3.5.5 Out-of-Sample Analysis — Performance Comparison 
In this part, the performance of strategies will be discussed based on the application of model 
solutions (based on the year 2009-2012 data) on the actual market of year 2013 for the Cape 
Wind project. Specifically, we will consider the revenue flows, and some statistical inferences for 
risks to measure the performance of the strategy we proposed and compare with the other two 
traditional strategies and an ideal case:  
1) Strategy S1 (Proposed Strategy):  
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This is the strategy we proposed, and solved by the stochastic program we built. The weight 𝜇 is 
4 and the Confidence Level 𝛽 is set as 0.9 for the case study, while both of the parameters can be 
adjusted according to the risk attitude of the wind IPPs. 
2) Strategy S2 (Traditional):  
The most traditional strategy for wind IPPs to bid in the DA market is to bid on the best hourly 
estimation of the next day electricity generation, which is usually at the 50th percentile of the 
generation estimation. The performance of this method is not based on optimized decision 
making but highly dependent on the accuracy of the wind speed forecast.  
3) Strategy S3 (Baseline):  
Another commonly used strategy is to maximize the expected hourly revenue, combining the 
estimation for wind resource and DA and RT electricity prices. This strategy can be easily 
modeled as follows: 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸[ 𝑅(𝑄𝐷𝐴, 𝑄𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝐷𝐴, 𝑃𝑅𝑇)] 
= 𝑚𝑎𝑥 [𝑃𝐷𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 + 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∙ (𝑄𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝑄𝐷𝐴)] 
(3-15) 
 𝑠. 𝑡.                                 
0 ≤ 𝑄𝐷𝐴 ≤ 𝐸[𝑄𝑅𝑇] 
Where 𝑃𝐷𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, and 𝑄𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ are respectively the expected mean for the three parameters. The result 
can be solved directly through linear programming. 
4) Strategy S4 (Ideal Case):  
This is an ideal case where all parameters are known to the wind IPPs thus are deterministic when 
they are making the decisions. The problem is easily solved by plugging in the actual data as the 
estimation for parameters. However, this strategy is not possible to achieve since the forecast 
cannot be perfect, the solution is purely derived for comparison and illustration. 
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5) Comparison of Strategy Performances 
With all four different strategies ready, we can conduct the out-of-sample analysis. The 
performances of each strategy are to be compared based on the actual revenue achieved, and the 
risks associated with the cash flow. The revenue cash flow for each strategy are shown in the 
Figure 3-21.  
 
Figure 3-21 Comparison of Hourly Cash Flow for Each Strategy 
It can be observed from the figures that the winter is the best time for wind projects to achieve 
profit, due to the abundant wind resource and high electricity value. However, winter is also the 
period when the cash flow has the highest volatility. The two traditional strategies, S2 and S3 both 
have highly negative hourly cash flow (losses), which can reach about −5 × 104dollars. This is a 
relatively severe problem for small IPPs. The proposed strategy S1effectively improves this 
situation, where there are very limited cash flow that are negative, and the biggest loss is 
controlled below −1 × 104 dollars. To this sense, the cash flow pattern of the proposed strategy 
S1is the best match to the ideal case S4. 
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of Cash Flow 
0.05-percentile 








1.83E+09 4.13E+07 0  -97  7.36E+07 
Traditional 
Strategy S2 
1.86E+09 6.27E+07 -411  -2470  7.51E+07 
Baseline 
Strategy S3 
1.87E+09 5.85E+07 -50  -1846  7.51E+07 
Ideal 
Strategy S4 
2.00E+09 4.71E+07 0  0  8.06E+07 
Some other results of the analysis are shown in the Table 3. The proposed strategy derives the 
least variance and semi-variance for the cash flow, which is the result from the CVaR control 
module of the model. Meanwhile, the left-side tale of the cash flow which represents the potential 
losses are of more interests than the general variances. Therefore, a 0.05 percentile and mean for 
that part is calculated for each strategy. The proposed strategy shows a dominant outperformance 
than the traditional strategies. Respectively, the mean of 0.05-percentile cash flow is increased 
by|(-97-(-2470))/(-2470)|=96%, and|(-97-(-1846))/(-1846)|=94.7%. However, as a trade-off, the 
proposed strategy also gets the least accumulated annual revenue, about (7.51-7.36)/7.51=2% less 
than the traditional two strategies. 
3.6 Effects of Proposed Offtake Strategy on the Existing Market 
The strategy we propose are specifically designed for wind IPPs to offtake their electricity 
generation in the market. It is expected to help the wind projects to better manage their resources, 
and participate in the power market in a more rational way. In the meantime, utilizing this 
strategy will also provide some benefits to the power market in terms of the electricity delivery 
stability, system reliability, and information use.  
As we discussed, the wind project can basically be dispatched no matter how much they bid in the 
day-ahead market, with only one constraint as not exceeding the expected generation. In the 
traditional manners, wind IPPs are tend to bid as much as possible in the DA market, while have a 
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high possibility not be able to deliver the promised generation. With the proposed strategy, the 
wind IPPs are tend to be more conservative, and push their decision making towards the RT 
market. The forecast accuracy can be largely improved during this period, and the bidding 
amount becomes more reliable. In other words, the strategy reduces the probability that the wind 
project will deviate too much from what it promises in the bidding. This is important for the 
system reliability especially with the increase penetration level of wind resource. And the other 
power producers and ISOs can also count on the wind IPPs decisions to adjust their hourly 
strategy, without worrying too much about the variability that wind will bring. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The offtake strategy proposed in this section helps wind IPPs make decision for hourly bidding 
based on estimation of future uncertain parameters including the wind speed, the DA electricity 
price and the RT electricity price. This approach considers the stochastic nature of these 
parameters, which is the key improvement of the two traditional methods which only consider the 
expected value. A stochastic program is built to solve the problem by incorporating conflicted 
objectives of maximizing the profit and minimizing the risks which is measured by a metric 
called Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR). Implementing the new strategy, the wind IPPs are 
expected to obtain a better balance between the profitability and the volatility of their revenue 
streams. The Cape Wind project in MA, the U.S. is discussed as the case study. With wind and 
electricity price data from year 2009 to 2012, the optimized offtake strategy for year 2013 is then 
solved. With a comprehensive out-of-sample analysis, the effectiveness of the new strategy is 
discussed and compared with traditional ones. Some other conclusions are duly drawn. 
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Chapter 4.  Offtake Strategy for Wind Projects in the Bilateral PPA 
Relationship 
4.1 Introduction 
Bilateral contracts play a critical role in the electricity market as hedging tools against the volatile 
spot market price. While typical customized bilateral contracts are medium-term and are for less 
than 5 years (Anderson, Hu, and Winchester 2007), there is a type of long-term bilateral contract 
(usually with terms of 10 to 25 years) called Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) which is 
commonly utilized for renewable energy projects. As a matter of fact, by 2008 over 60% of all 
commercial solar projects are financed using PPA framework, the number keeps increasing 
(Thumann and Woodroof 2009). American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) reports that 85% 
of the wind power capacity installed in year 2012 by IPPs was contracted under long-term PPAs, 
and only 15% was sold on the short-term spot market (AWEA 2013b). 
Especially for wind projects, as discussed in the last chapter, the uncertainties of the natural 
resources and the spot market construct a volatile revenue stream. Most wind energy projects 
developed by IPPs are not self-sustained, but dependent on the external support or regulatory 
incentives. Therefore, PPA is a more favorable way to offtake electricity productions since the 
buyer guarantees the project developer of a certain amount of long-term purchase, which makes 
the project more promised in the initialization phase. A well-designed bilateral PPA contract will 
help IPPs to secure the future revenue stream thus largely enhance the projects’ feasibility and 
bankability for initial financing. 
It is, however, a challenge to design and negotiate a PPA contract. In practice, there lacks a 
systematic method for project developers to analyze their negotiation position. Since renewable 
energy projects are typically deemed as risky and volatile to get initially financed, sometimes the 
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project developers have to accept some onerous terms requested by power purchasers so as to 
sign off as much offtake as possible to get the project started (Umanoff 2008). Paradoxically, in 
the current negotiation and designing process of long-term PPA, the risks of the project revenue 
stream are rarely considered due to the difficulties of forecasting future exogenous factors. 
Instead, the typical approach for valuing a PPA is to estimate the projected annual cash flow 
based on the forecasted electricity price and cost, and then discount the expected future profits by 
the cost of capital of the investing firm. The project’s feasibility is then evaluated by comparing 
the profit with the initial cost (Deng 1999). This so-called discounted cash flow (DCF) approach 
needs to be improved for wind projects, especially in the deregulated electricity industry because 
(1) it does not address the stochastic nature of the electricity price and the wind resource, which 
directly link to the volatility of the project future cash flow; and (2) it does not capture the 
seasonal pattern of the stochastic parameters, which fluctuate severely within a year. Once the 
pattern is captured, the generation capacity can be better utilized and the revenue and risks can be 
better balanced.  
This chapter will review the current practice of typical PPA negotiations, and identify the pros 
and cons. Three different modified strategies are then proposed including incorporating stochastic 
programming, improving the settlement schedule, and balancing the revenue and risks, to help 
both parties to better understand their positions in the stochastic environment. The key of the 
contract design is the risks of the project future cash flow, measured by the Conditional Value-at-
Risk (CVaR). Critical parameters in PPA, such as the electricity price, quantity, delivery penalty 
and outperformance reward will be determined by the stochastic programming with chance 
constraints related to the buyer’s attitude of signing the contract. The performance of different 
PPA design strategies will be further discussed based on the case study of the offshore wind 
project Cape Wind with out-of-sample validations.  
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4.2 Literature Reviews for Current PPA Design and Negotiation 
In the past times, PPA was a vehicle for utilities to purchase energy from each other in the 
vertically integrated power system (Kollins, Speer, and Cory 2010). For them, the PPA contract 
was regarded as a financial tool, a swap to hedge the risks from the electricity market, and is only 
different with forward contracts in the contract length. Therefore, one area with various literatures 
are to identify and manage the risks that are addressed by that type of PPA, such as electricity 
spot price volatility, network-forced outages, transmission congestion and load forecast errors 
(Gutiérrez-Alcaraz and Sheblé 2004, Dahlgren, Liu, and Lawarree 2003). The key problem of 
managing those PPAs is to balance the benefit and risks with a portfolio of contracts (Pearson 
2011). The methodologies proposed include fuzzy set theory (Schmutz, Gnansounou, and Sarlos 
2002), game theory (Ferrero, Shahidehpour, and Ramesh 1997), and stochastic optimization (Liu 
et al. 2000, Gabriel et al. 2006), etc.  
Nowadays, due to the higher demand for developing renewable energies, more and more utilities 
are signing PPAs with independent renewable energy producers so as to meet state renewable 
portfolio standards (RPS). Moreover, PPA has become a more commercial variant that involves 
buyers other than utilities such as schools, government agencies, and business centers that are 
seeking green energies. As a result, those PPAs are more focusing on the physical delivery of the 
“green” electricity, and are regarded as performance-based contracts (Kim, Cohen, and Netessine 
2007, Hansen 2006), where the payments are directly related to the actual delivery of the product, 
together with outperformance and penalty terms. Therefore, another area that is of more interest 
in the researches is the negotiation process of those PPAs (Anderson, Hu, and Winchester 2007). 
(Powell 1993) analyzed the contract process assuming that the generator decides on the price, and 
the buyer decides on the quantities. (Green 1999), on the contrary, assume that the seller and the 
buyer determine the contract quantities and contract prices respectively. Furthermore, an iterative 
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negotiation procedure is simulated in (Khatib and Galiana 2007) assuming both parties have their 
own preference of benefit and risk measures. 
The time frame of the bilateral relationship is also an important factor when both parties are 
evaluating the risks of the contract. Longer time horizon carry larger risks due to the future 
uncertainties from all different aspects (Anderson, Hu, and Winchester 2007), such as RE 
industry policies, new technology development, and market design renovation. The most common 
methodology to deal with the multiple time steps is to generate scenario trees for parameter 
forecasting (Høyland and Wallace 2001, Pflug 2001). For example, (Shrestha et al. 2005) defines 
a 256-scenario four-stage tree to model medium-term hydropower generation planning. (Carrión, 
Conejo, and Arroyo 2007) identifies a 72-period scenario tree and uses a scenario-reduction 
technique called fast-forward reduction algorithm to select a subset of scenarios to represent most 
scenarios. 
For wind project, there are mainly two classes of PPAs, namely buyer-driven and seller-driven, 
based on the project size, location, and project delivery methods. The contract proposing, 
designing and delivering procedure varies from each other. 
The U.S. DOE and the U.S. EPA both encourage wind projects and green power development 
through buyer-driven PPA relationships (Lund, Østergaard, and Stadler 2011). The well-known 
customer-sited PPA pattern has been utilized widely in the U.S. government agencies and many 
other institutions (EPA 2010, Shah 2011). In that relationship, a site owner intends to develop 
some in-house renewable energy, but they neither have the development capability, nor are 
eligible for the incentives such as tax credits. They sign a PPA with a renewable project developer, 
who is responsible for all the project financing, facility installing, and operation and maintenance, 
and only need to pay for the electricity generated through the project according to the price 
negotiated in the PPA. The project developer, usually owning the project, is able to get paid from 
the selling of the production, and benefit from the corresponding credits or accelerated 
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depreciation (EPA 2013). This type of PPA is similar to the idea of Energy Management Project 
(EMP) or Energy Savings Performance Contract (ESPC) (Thumann and Woodroof 2009), where 
the buyers of the product/service shop around for the sellers based on their expected benefit, and 
the sellers evaluate the profit by calculating their Net Present Value (NPV) or Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) (Newnan 2004), and give the quote. Those wind projects are usually small due to 
the limitation of the site and the electricity demand.  
For larger-scale wind projects with capacities ranging from ten to even several hundred MW such 
as industrial offshore projects, the PPAs are driven by the project developer, who is usually also 
the seller of the product. In that type of projects, the developer starts with the project initiation, 
gets permits, contracts for the designers, manufacturers and other stakeholders. After the project 
has a mature plan, proposed schedule, and especially that the generation capacity has been 
determined, the project developer starts to settle their offtake strategies. Long-term PPA is the 
favored option, not only because the future revenue streams are secured, but also that the offtake 
can be prolonged to a monthly even yearly base so that the short-term volatility can be 
smoothened out. Therefore, the project developers usually try their best to lock as much as their 
offtake with PPAs, and the remaining capacity will be sold to the spot market. With these PPAs, 
the project’s future revenue and cash flow risks are the key concerns when the project developers 
propose the contract, and seek for buyers (Jenkins and Lim 1999). In practice, the PPA and 
project financing are conducted simultaneously, and the negotiation process could take long 
period of time even years. While only when the project is endorsed by a solid offtake plan, it is 
possible to get a sound financing package. 
Although the long-term PPA has some obvious advantage over short-term offtake strategies, and 
it has been applied in the electricity market for a long period of time, it is still in the immature 
phase for the wind energy industry (Kollins, Speer, and Cory 2010). There still lacks a common 
framework to systematically design the contract terms and evaluate the benefits, given the high 
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volatility of the electricity market and the wind power resources, as well as the uncertainties of 
the industry. In order to get the project financed, the developer is usually in an inferior position 
when designing the contract, as well as negotiating with the buyer. Although the future volatilities 
are expected to be lowered, PPA may still sacrifice a fair amount of the expected profit, together 
with some good opportunities associated with the uncertainties, which makes the PPA prices 
generally lower than the wholesale market electricity price (Wiser and Bolinger 2012). The 
typical viewpoint in the RE industry for current PPAs are that they under-evaluate the real value 
of those RE projects (AWEA 2013a). 
4.3 Contribution and Boundaries 
Addressing the discussed problems, the contribution of this section are threefold: 
(1) Propose three improved strategies using stochastic programming to address the risks from 
both the volatile electricity market and the uncertain wind resource, with seasonal trend fully 
considered. Each strategy has unique framework to follow and can be solved through 
commercially available software package. With analytical solutions, the performance measure 
metric of the strategies are defined, and the effectiveness of all the strategies are analyzed and 
compared with the business-as-usual baseline strategy. 
(2) Treat the PPA as performance-based contract, and quantitatively design the contract terms. 
The key contract terms that are essentially associated with the performance-based mechanism are 
the outperformance price, and underperformance penalty, which are interacting with the other 
contract terms. These two terms are not only considered, but also solved simultaneously through 
the optimization. 
(3) Incorporate both parties’ attitudes in the single model. All strategies are modeled from the 
project developer’s perspective, while taking buyer’s non-regret probability as chance constraint. 
 
71 
Therefore with the new methodologies, the contract design plays a role of benefit sharing and risk 
sharing. 
Meanwhile, we make several assumptions and define the boundary of the problem discussed in 
this section as: 
(1) Only one PPA contract is considered in the long-term offtake strategy. Although it is usually 
recommended for the wind IPP to diversify the contracts among different counter parties for 
credit risk reasons (Anderson, Hu, and Winchester 2007), we assume a single contract design in 
our problem. As for the problem of allocating the generation capacity between different buyers, 
the theory of portfolio management can be used to further develop the multiple contracts (Reilly 
and Brown 2011, Pearson 2011). This one-buyer contract can be regarded as the special case of 
identical buyers, or the weighted sum of the portfolio contracts. 
(2) Detailed one-year contract terms are solved. For a long-term PPA, it is usually assumed that 
the wind and electricity price respectively follow similar patterns within one year, therefore, the 
only different term applied to different years is an escalation rate, which is used to deal with the 
annual inflation, as well as the long-term uncertainty. The decision for the escalation rate depends 
on different parties’ estimation for future uncertainties such as the new policies or technology 
development. In this section, we only consider the contract for one year. The escalation rate can 
be discussed in the future researches using the methodology that is reviewed in the previous part, 
the scenario tree (Shrestha et al. 2005, Carrión, Conejo, and Arroyo 2007). 
(3) Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) and other environment attributes are not considered. The 
environmental benefits associated with the renewable energy projects are another big topic with 
complicated problem settings such as carbon market, carbon trading scheme and market design 
problems. In detailed trading, the RECs can be regarded as a bi-product that the project generate 
and sold as unbundled, or in some contract the electricity and RECs are bundled as one price, 
depending on the negotiation for both parties, and is case sensitive. For the contract design, if the 
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RECs are considered, they can be treated similarly as the electricity, with a separate stochastic 
REC price. However, due to the unclear future of the REC market, and the relative low value, it is 
not considered in this study. 
4.4 PPA Contract Design  
Now we consider a contract where the project is selling all of its generation through, and the 
buyer is large enough to digest all the deliveries. At that case, there is no curtail requested from 
the demand side, and all the generations will be delivered to the buyer. Therefore, the key 
problem of the contract design is about how much the power is, and what the mechanisms are to 
share the profit and the risks.  
We start with the simplest contract which is most common in the industry, and propose three 
different strategies to improve it. The improvement include bringing stochastic parameters in the 
model, and designing different settlement methods. 
4.4.1 Deterministic Scenario: the Baseline Strategy S1 
The deterministic decision making is the most straight forward strategy that wind IPPs could go 
for, and is commonly practiced in the industry. In this strategy, the unknown parameters are 
estimated through point estimation with statistics of historic data or forecasting. In specific, the 
future electricity generation is estimated by calculating the annual capacity factor of the project, 
and the electricity market price is estimated by the expected mean based on the historic market 
price.  
For each year, there are three variables to be decided, the quantity, the price, and the 




𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸 [?̅? × ?̅? + 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((∑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1
− ?̅?) , 0) + 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ((∑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1
− ?̅?) , 0)] (4-1) 
   𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜                                                      
 𝐸[𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝐴)] − 𝐸[𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡)] ≤ 0 (4-2) 
 ?̅? ≥ 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ (4-3) 
Where  
?̅? — Contract Price, $/Mwh 
?̅? — Contract Delivery Amount, Mwh 
𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ — Contract Outperformance Price, $/Mwh 
𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗 — Actual Generation Amount for month j, Mwh, j=1,…12 
𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑗— Actual Market Electricity Price for month j, $/Mwh, j=1,…12 





𝑗=1  — Mean of Actual Annual Market Electricity Price, $/Mwh 
Equation (4-1) is the objective function pursuing to maximize the expected annual revenue of the 
project. Each month, the IPP gets paid for the actual delivered quantity times the contract price, 
and at the end of the year, the accumulated delivery ∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 , 𝑗 = 1,…12 is calculated to be 
compared with the contract quantity. If the actual delivery is more than what is contracted, 
∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 ≥ ?̅?, then the IPP will be settled for the additional amount with the outperformance 
price 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, making the revenue as ?̅? ∙ ?̅? + 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ ∙ (∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 − ?̅?). On the other hand, if the delivery 
doesn’t hit the contracted amount, ∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 ≤ ?̅?, then the deficiency will be made up for by the 
mean price of the market spot price, realized as a negative revenue, making the revenue as ?̅? ∙
?̅? − 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∙ (?̅? − ∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 ). 
Expression (4-2) is a non-regret constraint that represents the buyer’s willingness to sign the 
contract, where the regret is the difference between the cost of electricity bought from the 
 
74 
contract minus that is bought directly from the wholesale market. Since we assume a large buyer, 
who has higher demand than possible delivery from the project, that is 𝑄𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 ≫ ∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 . The 
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Combined, the cost from the contract can be written as: 
?̅? ∙ ?̅? + 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 − ?̅?) , 0) + 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ((∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 − ?̅?) , 0) + 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅̅ ∙
(𝑄𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 − ∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 )  
Meanwhile, the total cost for the buyer to purchases the electricity directly from the market is: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) = 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑄𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 
Hence, the non-regret constraint (4-2) can be written as: 
𝐸 [?̅? ∙ ?̅? + 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 − ?̅?) , 0) + 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ((∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 − ?̅?) , 0) − 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅̅ ∙
∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 ] ≤ 0  
Moreover, we define another variable 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 , ?̅?) , with which another two 
constraints would be added to the model, and the max and min function in the objective and 
constraints can be replaced as: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 − ?̅?), 0) = 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 − ?̅?  
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ((∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 − ?̅?), 0) = ∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 − 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥  
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Since the problem treat the parameter deterministic as estimations from historic data or 
forecasting, the problem can be finally expressed as (4-4) to (4-8) and solved directly through 
some nonlinear optimization techniques. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ?̅? × ?̅? + 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ ∙ (𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 − ?̅?) + 𝐸[𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅] ∙ (𝐸 [∑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1
] − 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥) (4-4) 
   𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜                                                      
 ?̅? ∙ ?̅? + 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ ∙ (𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 − ?̅?) − 𝐸[𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅̅] ∙ 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ 0 (4-5) 
 ?̅? ≥ 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ (4-6) 




 𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≥ ?̅? (4-8) 
4.4.2 Improved Strategy for Annual Settlement Contract under Uncertainty: Strategy S2 
Strategy S2 is an improved strategy on top of Strategy S1, where the contract terms are based on 
an annual settlement with monthly payment schedule. The key improvement in this strategy is 
that it treats the wind resource and electricity price as stochastic parameters. Meanwhile, the 
constraints associated with the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) are added to the model as the 
risk management module. The stochastic programming for Strategy S2 can be formulated as (4-9) 
to (4-12): 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸 [?̅? × ?̅? + 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((∑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1
− ?̅?) , 0) + 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑖𝑛((∑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1
− ?̅?) , 0)] (4-9) 
   𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜                                                      
 𝜙𝛽(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) ≤ 𝑤 (4-10) 
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 𝑝𝑟(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝐴) − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) ≤ 0) ≥ 𝑎 (4-11) 
 ?̅? ≥ 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ (4-12) 
Where 
𝑤— Threshold for the CVaR of the settlement cash flow 
𝑎— Confidence level for the chance constraint 
There are two main modifications made on the Strategy S1 deterministic model. Firstly, in order 
to address the stochastic feature with the anticipative decision variables, chance constraints (4-11) 
are used to replace the traditional deterministic regret constraints to explicitly deal with 
randomness associated with buyer’s cost. With the chance constraint, the buyer is only willing to 
sign the contract when the probability that the regret negatively exceeds a pre-defined confidence 
level 𝑎. The higher the 𝑎 is, the more risk-averse the buyer is, and usually lower profit the seller 
can get. 
Since the buyer of a PPA also considers the contract as a one-time decision making, the chance 
constraint should be based on the whole year. Therefore, there is only one chance constraint in 
terms of the difference of the total cost, as shown in (4-13), where the stochastic variables are the 
mean market price 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ in terms of the monthly market price 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑗  and the monthly generation 
quantity 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,…12. 
𝑃𝑟 (?̅? ∙ ?̅? + 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 − ?̅?) , 0) + 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ((∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1 − ?̅?) , 0) −
𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅̅ ∙ ∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗 ≤ 0
12
𝑗=1 ) ≥ 𝑎  
(4-13) 
The second modification for the model is adding the (4-10), a constraint that use the Conditional 
Value-at-Risk (CVaR) to control the risks of the settlement revenue stream, by defining tolerance 
level 𝛽  and loss threshold  𝑤 . The CVaR risk function 𝜙𝛽(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅), by definition, 
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measures the conditional expectation of the annual loss associated with stochastic parameters 
𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗  and 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ , relative to that loss being 𝛼𝛽(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗 , 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  or larger. The CVaR risk 
function for this problem can be written as 
𝜙𝛽(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) (4-14) 
= (1 − 𝛽)−1 × ∬ 𝑓(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)𝑝(𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)𝑑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗𝑑𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑗≥𝛼𝛽(?̅?,?̅?,𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅̅ ,𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗,𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
 
Where 𝛼𝛽(𝑥) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝛼 ∈ ℝ:𝛹(𝑥, 𝛼) ≥ 𝛽) , is known as the 𝛽 -VaR for variable x. And 
𝑓(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) is the annual loss function (negative revenue), which can be expressed as: 
𝑓(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) = −𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 (4-15) 
= −?̅? × ?̅? − 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥((∑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1
− ?̅?) , 0) − 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑖𝑛((∑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1
− ?̅?) , 0) 
Detailed mathematical transformation for the CVaR constraint will be addressed later to discuss 
the solvability of this stochastic program.  
4.4.3 Monthly Settlement Contract: Strategy S3 
Instead of annual settlement, we consider a more complicated monthly settlement as the third 
contract design strategy. The decision variables in this problem are on a monthly base. Altogether 
there will be 12 × 3 decision variables for the whole year, which are the monthly contract amount, 
the monthly contract price, and the monthly outperformance price. It is worth notice that for each 
month, the decision variables (𝑄𝑗̅̅ ̅,𝑃?̅?,𝑃𝑂𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ), 𝑗 = 1…12 can be assumed to be independent, thus the 
large problem can be separated into 12 independent monthly problems, and each has 3 decision 




𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸 [𝑃?̅? × 𝑄𝑗̅̅ ̅ + 𝑃𝑂𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗 − 𝑄𝑗̅̅ ̅), 0) + 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑗 ∙ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ((𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗 −𝑄𝑗̅̅ ̅), 0)] 
(4-16) 
Subject to 
𝜙𝛽𝑗(𝑄𝑗̅̅ ̅, 𝑃?̅?, 𝑃𝑂𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑗) ≤ 𝑤𝑗 
𝑝𝑟𝑗(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝐴) − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) ≤ 0) ≥ 𝑎 
𝑃?̅? ≥ 𝑃𝑂𝑗̅̅ ̅̅  
Where the formulas for the CVaR constraints and the chance constraints are both modified for a 
monthly base.  
Applying this method, the revenue will be settled for each month by comparing the actual 
delivery amount and the contracted amount, as what is done annually with the first two strategies. 
The reason for proposing this strategy is trying to capture the significant differences of the 
parameters among different months. With the seasonal trend and the high volatility of the 
monthly electricity price, an annual contract price cannot represent accurately the value of the 
generated electricity for each month. As what is discussed in the Strategy S2, the annual price and 
generation amount are set at a compromised level, where the revenues for each month are 
averaged out. As the result, the volatilities of the monthly cash flow are not controlled effectively. 
With this new strategy S3, the contract price and power delivery amount solved are expected to 
have a seasonal trend that is correlated to the forecasting of the electricity price and the power 
generation. This strategy grants both parties with more degree of freedom when designing their 
contract, while of course with the cost of higher problem complexity and more calculation time. 
4.4.4 Contract with Annual Settlement and Monthly Price Terms: Strategy S4 
Although strategy S3 is expected to be more accurately capture the uncertainty of the stochastic 
variables, one drawback of the strategy S3 is that the monthly volatility is realized instantly 
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without a buffer. While if with an annual settlement, all the deviations are pushed to be settled at 
the end of the year, and the positive and negative fluctuates can be cancelled out. 
Therefore, as strategy S4, we propose a combination of the strategy S2 and S3, in which the term 
of price is monthly base, while the contract is to be settled annually. More specifically, in each 
month, the buyer will be paying for the amount of the actual delivery times the monthly price 𝑃?̅?, 
while at the end of the year, the accumulated delivery will be calculated to compare with the 
annual contract amount ?̅? and settle with the annual outperformance price 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ or the annual mean 
of the market price 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. With this design, the problem can be expressed as: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸 [∑(𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗 × 𝑃?̅?)
12
𝑗=1






) ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((∑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1




− ?̅?) , 0)] 
(4-17) 
Subject to 
𝜙𝛽𝑗(?̅?, 𝑃?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑗) ≤ 𝑤𝑗 (4-18) 
𝑝𝑟(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝐴) − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) ≤ 0) ≥ 𝑎 
𝑃?̅? ≥ 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ 
Where the objective still consider the annual revenue, while with different price for each month. 
Meanwhile, similar to strategy S3, this strategy controls the monthly cash flow volatility with the 
monthly CVaR constraint. However, since the buyer still evaluates the contract as an annual 
package, the chance constraint is expressed of buyer’s annual cost. 
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4.5 Solvability of the Model  
Figure 4-1 illustrates the cash flow of different strategies. Since each strategy follow different 
schedule and settlement policy, the patterns and detailed amount of the cash flow vary from each 
other.  
 
Figure 4-1 Cash Flow for Four Different Strategies 
Table 4-1 summarizes the key features of the four different strategies. As discussed, strategy S2 









S1 Annually No Forecasting 
Annual Delivery Quantity ?̅?, Annual Price ?̅?,  
Annual Outperformance Price 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ 
S2 Annually Yes Stochastic 
Annual Delivery Quantity ?̅?, Annual Price ?̅?,  
Annual Outperformance Price 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ 
S3 Monthly Yes Stochastic 
Monthly Delivery Quantity 𝑄𝑗̅̅ ̅, Monthly Price 





Annual Delivery Quantity ?̅?, Monthly Price 𝑃?̅?, 
Annual Outperformance Price 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ 
Now that we have all models for the four strategies built, the next step is to deal with the 
solvability of the models. Some of the problems are relatively easy to solve through some classic 
mathematical processes, such as the deterministic quadratic optimization problem of strategy S1. 
On the other hand, the other stochastic problems may require some simulation techniques and 
heuristic algorithms to take care of the sampling and searching procedure. Meanwhile, in order to 
deal with the troublesome mathematical properties of the CVaR constraint, some specific 
methodologies will be utilized to transform the problems to solvable formulations. In order to 
illustrate the process clearly, we take strategy S4 as example. The methodology can be applied to 
strategy S2 and S3 similarly. 
4.5.1 Constraints for Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) 
We first consider how to deal with the CVaR constraint. It is proved by (Krokhmal, Palmquist, 
and Uryasev 2002) that in a general form, if 𝑅(𝑋) is concave and  𝜙𝛽(𝑋) and set 𝑋 are convex, 
then the following two problems generate the same efficient frontier.  
Problem 1: 𝑚𝑖𝑛−𝑅(𝑥)  𝑠. 𝑡. 𝜙𝛽(𝑥) ≤ 𝜔, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋. 
Problem 2:  𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜙𝛽(𝑥) − 𝜇𝑅(𝑥) , 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝜇 ≥ 0.  
Where 𝜇 is the weight allocated between the revenue and risk control, depending on each cases. 
Usually, risk-averse project owner will choose smaller 𝜇. 
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Meanwhile, since the problem for strategy S4 constructs 12 constraints of monthly CVaR, 
𝜙𝛽𝑗(𝑥), 𝑗 = 1,…12. The CVaR in the objective should be replaced by the mean of monthly 
CVaR. The problem 2 can be further extended to problem 2’: 
Problem 2’:  𝑚𝑖𝑛
1
12 
∑ 𝜙𝛽𝑗(𝑥)𝑗 − 𝜇𝑅(𝑥) , 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝜇 ≥ 0, 𝑗 = 1,…12. 
Furthermore, in order to deal with the troublesome mathematical properties of the 𝛽 -CVaR 
𝜙𝛽(𝑋) , (Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000) proposed a methodology by defining a simpler 
expression 𝐹𝛽(𝑥, 𝛼) with its convexity in the variable α. Hence, instead of determining a vector 𝑥 
that yields the minimization for the combination of 𝛽-CVaR and the expected profit, one can 
equivalently minimize the combination of 𝐹𝛽(𝑥, 𝛼) and the expected profit. The defined 𝐹𝛽(𝑥, 𝛼) 
can be used instead of 𝜙𝛽(𝑥) to solve the problem 2, which makes the following problem 3 




∑ 𝐹𝛽𝑗(𝑥, 𝛼)𝑗 − 𝜇𝑅(𝑥) , 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝜇 ≥ 0, 𝑗 = 1,… 12. 
Applying this methodology, the F functions of the monthly CVaR problems can be defined as 
follows: 
𝐹𝛽𝑗(?̅?, 𝑃?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑗 , 𝛼) (4-19) 







𝑡      𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑡 > 0,
0      𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑡 ≤ 0.
 
And the monthly revenues functions are given by:  
When 𝑗 = 1, . . .11, 
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𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑗 = 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗 × 𝑃?̅? (4-20) 
When j=12, 






) ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((∑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗
12
𝑗=1




− ?̅?) , 0) 
(4-21) 
Then the original problem is equivalent to the following (4-22), where 




∑𝐹𝛽𝑗(?̅?, 𝑃?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝛼)
𝑗
− 𝜇𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒(?̅?, 𝑃?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑗)] (4-22) 
Subject to 
𝑝𝑟(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝐴) − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) ≤ 0) ≥ 𝑎 
𝑃?̅? ≥ 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑗 = 1… ,12 
4.5.2 Chance-Constrained Programming (CCP) and Genetic Algorithm (GA)  
The problem for strategy S2 to S4 all include a stochastic objective function and both stochastic 
and deterministic constraints, which makes the whole models formulated as Chance-Constrained 
Programming (CCP). Due to the non-linear attribute, the optimization problems cannot be 
transferred to some simple form of linear program problems. Meanwhile, the complicated 
distribution of different stochastic parameters makes it hard to provide the deterministic 
equivalent for the chance constraint. Therefore, we are utilizing Genetic Algorithm (GA) to deal 




Figure 4-2 Flow Chart for Genetic Algorithm 
The framework of performing GA to solve general optimization problems has been summarized 
in the book of (Liu 2009). Adjusted from that framework, the specific algorithm for our model is 
proposed as in Figure 4-2. 
Specifically, there are 7 steps to finish the procedure. 
Step 1: Initialization. Define pop_size chromosomes as the number of individuals in a generation. 
Each chromosome 𝑉𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  has N=26 dimensions representing the decision 
variables (?̅?, 𝑃?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝛼𝑗), 𝑗 = 1,…12 . Iteratively generate pop_size feasible chromosomes from 
constraint check through stochastic simulation. The first generation is initialized. 
Step 2: Ranking. Calculate the objective function mean for all chromosomes through stochastic 
simulation, and rearrange the ranks based on their fitness to the objective. Due to the 
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minimization objective, the smaller the objective mean value, the smaller rank order the 
corresponding chromosome is allocated.  
Step 3: Evaluation. Define the rank-based evaluation function as 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑉𝑖) = 𝑐(1 − 𝑐)
𝑖−1, 𝑖 =
1,… , 𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, with which the better the chromosome, the higher evaluation value it will have.  
Step 4: Selection. Spin the roulette wheel with the probability proportional to the evaluation value, 
such that better chromosomes will have more chance to be selected to produce offspring. pop_size 
chromosomes will be selected for further operation. 
Step 5: Generation update. Define probability parameters 𝑃𝑐 and 𝑃𝑚, with which 𝑃𝑐 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 of 
the selected chromosomes will be conducted crossover, and 𝑃𝑚 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  of the selected 
chromosomes will be mutated. A new generation with 𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 updated chromosomes is then 
established. Each crossover and mutation operation will go through constraint check to make sure 
the feasibility of the new chromosomes.  
Step 6: Repeat step 2 to step 5 to for a given number of cycles G, such that G generations are 
generated, and the corresponding objective mean for all 𝐺 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 chromosomes are obtained. 
Step 7: Report the best chromosome and the minimal objective as the optimal solution. 
4.5.3 Simulation 
It is worth noted that the GA process for our chance-constrained programming (CCP) is different 
with that of the classic optimization problems, especially with the module of objective calculation 
and constraint check. Since the parameters in the objective and chance constraint are stochastic, it 
is necessary to conduct Monte Carlo simulation to approximate those stochastic functions. 
(Poojari and Varghese 2008) discussed about the simulation process within the GA framework. 
Adjust that process with the CVaR in the objective function, we can conduct the simulation as 
follows (taking Strategy S4 as example).  
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For stochastic parameter vector 𝜉 = (𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑗, 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗) , let Ω = (𝜉
1, 𝜉𝑘 , … 𝜉|Ω|)  denotes the 
approximate sample space to be generated for each individual chromosome 𝑉𝑖, and H denote the 
set of chance constraints. In the initialization phase, since there are pop_size individuals to be 
generate in the population, while some would fail the constraint check, hence there are at least 
|Ω| × 𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 × |𝐻| function evaluation to be performed. In the evaluation step, all pop_size 
individuals of G generations will be calculated for their objective functions, hence there will be 
|Ω| × 𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 × 𝐺 evaluations. In the crossover step, since pop_size/2 pairs are to be operated 




𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 × |𝐻| × 𝐺  crossover evaluation. Similarly in the mutation step, |Ω| × 𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 ×
|𝐻| × 𝐺 evaluations are to be performed because pop_size individuals will be operated mutation.  
Specifically, the random vectors 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑗𝑘  and 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗𝑘 , 𝑘 = 1,… , |Ω|  are independently following 
underlying probability distributions. Accordingly, the stochastic objective and constraints can be 
computed through the constructed sample space. For each evaluation, the objective function can 
be obtained through calculating each part with Ω series of vectors 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗𝑘 , 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑗𝑘  (𝑘 = 1,⋯Ω): 









𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑗𝑘 = 𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗𝑘 × 𝑃?̅? for 𝑗 = 1, . . .11, 






) ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((∑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗𝑘
12
𝑗=1












∑ [∑(𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗𝑘 × 𝑃?̅?)
12
𝑗=1









− ?̅?) , 0)
Ω
𝑘=1
+ 𝑃𝑅𝑇𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑖𝑛((∑𝑄𝑅𝑇𝑗𝑘
12
𝑗=1
− ?̅?) , 0)] 
And the value for the chance constraint is the frequency with which the current solution satisfies 
the constraints. Let 𝑛𝑗 be the number of random vectors that satisfy the chance constraints. Then 




, 𝑗 = 1,⋯ ,12 (4-24) 
The (4-24) is also referred to when conducting the Monte Carlo simulation for the initialization.  
4.6 Case Study for Cape Wind Project 
The Cape Wind project is again referred to as the case study for this chapter. In order to make the 
strategies comparable with each other, different strategy will be applied with same assumptions 
associated with the market, the competitor, the buyer and the wind IPP itself. The information 
collected from the power market and the meteorology station will be processed according to 
different need of strategy setup. For example, the sampling seed is established based on monthly 
data, instead of hourly like chapter three.  
4.6.1 Results for Different Strategies 
With the stochastic information obtained, we are able to run the programs for each of the four 
strategies. The strategy S1 will be solved though the MATLAB® nonlinear solve system, and  
strategy S2 to S4 will be solved through the coded GA programming also through MATLAB®. 
Table 4-2 summaries the parameters for the GA programing for each strategy:  
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Table 4-2 Parameters for Stochastic GA Programming Setup 
  
S2 
S3 (for each 
month) 
S4 
Number of Variable, N 4 4 26 
Size of Population, K=10*N 40 40 260 
Number of Generation, G=10*K 400 400 2600 
Number of Sampling, Omega 1000 
Probability of Crossover, Pc 0.7 
Probability of Mutation, Pm 0.1 
In this part, the solutions of each model will first be discussed with some observations, then some 
statistics analysis an out-of-sample analysis will be conducted to analyze and compare the 
performance of different strategies in the next part. 
1. Solutions for Strategy S1 
For strategy S1, we established the model for a nonlinear programming which can be solved 
directly from commercially available software. The solution of the program is not unique, where 
the following two sets of solutions are all optimized and indifferent: 
(1) ?̅? = 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, ?̅? = 𝑄𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ 𝑖𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 
(2) ?̅? = 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ = 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, ?̅? 𝑖𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 
The solutions show that the contract price will be set as equal to the expected market price. 
Meanwhile, either that the contract price equals the expected generation, or that the 
outperformance equals the expected market price will make the total expected revenue 
maximized and equal to 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ × 𝑄𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ . However, this is true only when the forecast for the 
electricity generation and electricity price are perfectly accurate, or can be regarded as 
deterministic parameters.  
Among the two options, the first one usually sounds more reasonable to both contract 
counterparts in practice, which is to settle at the expected price and the expected quantity while 
negotiating on the outperformance price. As a matter of fact, the two PPA contract signed for the 
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Cape Wind project also follows this practice. As for the outperformance price, they go for half of 
the contract price, which is also not uncommon.  
With the 1000 sets of samples from the generation amount and market price sampling seeds, we 
are able to obtain the expected price and quantity as solutions for the first option of strategy S1, 
and outperformance price is set as half of the contract price, as shown in the Table 4-3. 







41.6337 1.6164E+06 20.8169 
2. Solutions for Strategy S2 
Strategy S2, on the other hand, consider the uncertainty of the parameters, and is set up to be 
solved by the proposed chance-constraint based genetic algorithm. Based on the same 1000 sets 
of Monte Carlo simulation from the sampling seeds, the solutions for the Strategy S2 are 
summarized in the Table 4-4: 







41.8036 1.6158E+06 15.1884 
Figure 4-3 shows the progressing of the solutions through the evolution procedure of the strategy 
S2 GA programming. With the 400 generations, the decision variables start with a high volatility 
in the searching area, get stabilized after around the 100th generation, and progressively moving 




Figure 4-3 Evolution Procedure for GA Programming (Strategy S2) 
3. Solutions for Strategy S3 
Different with strategy S2, the problem for strategy S3 includes twelve GA programs. Since each 
problem can be regarded as independent, they are solved separately with the heuristic searching 
and derive twelve sets of optimized solutions. For all the GA evolution, the algorithms start with 
large range of searching points, and the chromosomes gradually progress through the iteration 
goes. 
 
Figure 4-4 shows some of the solutions of the three variables for different months, as examples of 




Figure 4-4 Examples of GA Evolving Results for ?̅?, ?̅? 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ (Strategy S3) 
Take January as one example of the strategy S3 problems. Among all 400 generations, 228 sets of 
solutions are unique. The solutions are sorted according to their objective value, which makes the 
order of the solutions representing the design for contract from bad to good. According to the 
Figure 4-5, with better contract design, the monthly revenue of the project increases, and the F-
function for project risk decreases. The decrease of F-function value causes the corresponding 
decrease of CVaR, which means that the risk of the project cash flow is better controlled.  
 
Figure 4-5 GA Result of Monthly Revenue, Fbeta and CVaR (Strategy S3, Jan.) 
Meanwhile, with better contract design, the no-regret probability of the buyer is approaching the 
chance constraint threshold, which is 50% in this case (Figure 4-6). This can be regarded as a 
benefit sharing mechanism, when approaching the no-regret constraint, the owner is getting 
higher benefit, while the buyer is pushing to their threshold for accepting the contract. With this 
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being observed, the threshold of the chance constraint is an important negotiation point for the 
buyer to anticipate the project owner’s proposal.   
 
Figure 4-6 GA Result for No-regret Probability 
Table 4-5 lists the ultimate solutions for strategy S3’s decision variables of each month. And the 
seasonal trend of the solutions are obviously shown in Figure 4-7. Both the contract quantity and 
contract price are strictly following seasonal pattern that correlate with the trend of the wind 
resource and the expected electricity market price. Due to the high instability of the wind resource 
and market price, the solutions have high volatility, with the range of [$37.54, $52.49] and 
[8.26×104Mwh, 1.69×105Mwh] respectively. While the outperformance prices don’t follow a 
significant seasonal pattern, nor have obvious relationship with the contract price or the contract 
generation amount. They are in the small range of [$7.21, $12.15].  
Table 4-5 Solutions for Strategy S3 
 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
P 52.49 42.92 38.61 37.76 41.23 41.29 
Q 1.62E+05 1.48E+05 1.50E+05 1.32E+05 1.13E+05 8.26E+04 
Po 7.21 7.82 12.15 12.13 10.20 8.68 
 
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
P 45.60 41.93 38.24 37.54 37.55 50.41 
Q 8.54E+04 9.58E+04 1.24E+05 1.56E+05 1.53E+05 1.69E+05 




Figure 4-7 Monthly Price P, Quantity Q, and Outperformance Prices Po (Strategy S3) 
4. Solutions for Strategy S4 
Similar methodology and solution algorithms are applied to the strategy S4, except the decision is 
based on annual settlement with different monthly contract price. Therefore the decision variables 
becomes (𝑃?̅?,  ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅), 𝑗 = 1,…12 . With the generation number increased to 2600, the GA 
algorithm succeeds getting the optimized solution, as shown in the Table 4-6. Unlike strategy S3, 
the solution monthly price 𝑃?̅? are not obviously follow the seasonal trend of the expected market 
price. Instead, they fluctuate around the expected prices. With five months higher than the 
expected mean, and seven months lower, as shown in Figure 4-8.  
Table 4-6 Solutions for Strategy S4 
P Q PO 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
1.6325E+06 10.542 
46.011 48.937 34.352 38.997 37.601 42.563 
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 




Figure 4-8 Compare of Contract Price P with Expected Market Price (Strategy S3, S4) 
4.6.2 Performance Comparison of Different Strategies 
With all four strategies solved, we now compare the performance of each strategy based on the 
1000 samples of the uncertain parameters, and an out-of-sample analysis. The performances are 
discussed in terms of the revenue pattern, cash flow risks, as well as buyer’s attitude for each 
strategy.  
1. Expected Revenue and Risk Control 
We start with the expected revenue pattern for different strategies, which are derived through 
combing the results from each strategy and the 1000 sampling sets.  
Observation 4-1. Strategy S2 improves the Strategy S1 in terms of both the expected annual 
revenue, and the expected cash flow risk. 
For strategy S1 and S2, the key difference is that strategy S2 considers the problem as in a 
stochastic environment, which can merit the project owner to balance or hedge between different 
scenarios of the uncertain parameters. Therefore, we first compare the two strategies using the 
metric called the value of Stochastic Solutions (VSS), which assesses the value of knowing and 
using distributions on future outcomes (Birge and Louveaux 2011). The results of the two 
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strategies, the expected revenue, and the risk measure metrics β-VaR and β-CVaR are 
summarized in Table 4-7. 













Annual Rev. ($) 
S1 41.6337 1.6158E+06 20.3843 6.7186E+07 -5.4715E+07 -5.4392E+07 
S2 41.8036 1.6142E+06 15.1884 6.7358E+07 -5.5379E+07 -5.5058E+07 
As shown in the table, the increase of the expected annual revenue with the stochastic 
programming, which is also known as the Value of Stochastic Solutions VSS is $1.72×105. If we 
incorporate the CVaR into the evaluation of the stochastic program, we can define a modified 
β−VSS, which is the difference of (Rev−CVaR) between the deterministic programming and the 
stochastic programming. Therefore, in this case 
β−VSS=(Rev−CVaR)S2−(Rev−CVaR) S1=$8.37×105 
Observation 4-2. CVaR risk control causes the revenue distribution to have negative skewness. 
The expected distributions of the annual revenues for the four strategies are derived as in the 
Figure 4-9. As shown of the distributions, the revenue from strategy S1 is about symmetric, while 
the other three strategies are all having negative skewness, which means fatter tail to the right and 
longer tail to the left. This is mainly because the risk control module in the strategy S2 to S4 are 
minimizing the one-side CVaR, which tend to push the small revenues towards right. The strategy 
S1, on the other hand, does not have the risk control mechanism, hence only maximizing the 




Figure 4-9 Distribution of Annual Revenue for Four Strategies (1000 samples) 
Observation 4-3. Strategy S3 and S4 sacrifice the annual revenue and enhance the risk control 
mechanism, especially largely reduce the monthly cash flow CVaR (Figure 4-10). 
 
Figure 4-10 Monthly CVaR for Different Strategies 
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Take strategy S1 as the baseline, the improvement of the expected performance can be converted 
to a percentage with the metric of revenue and CVaR. As shown in Table 4-8, the strategy S2 to 
S4 all improve the annual cash flow CVaR by solving the stochastic programming with the risk 
control module added. Strategy S3 and S4 sacrifice a small portion of the monthly revenue, while 
significantly increase the risk control of the monthly cash flow. The CVaR amount from strategy 
S3 and S4 beat both S1 and S2 by more than 100%.  
Table 4-8 Improvement from Baseline Strategy S1 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
Annual Revenue ($) 6.72E+07 6.74E+07 6.66E+07 6.69E+07 
Improve of Annual Revenue (%)  0.26% -0.87% -0.40% 
Annual CVaR ($) -5.44E+07 -5.51E+07 -5.57E+07 -5.53E+07 
Improve of Annual CVaR (%)  1.22% 2.47% 1.74% 
Average Monthly CVaR ($) -2.20E+06 -2.21E+06 -5.27E+06 -5.17E+06 
Improve of Monthly CVaR (%)  0.71% 139.72% 135.18% 
The reason behind the performance difference is that the first two strategies are making decisions 
based on an annual base, and rely on the possibilities that the cash flow fluctuates of different 
months will cancel out with each other. This is the brighter side that the risks are taken advantage 
of if the equity holder or debt holder only consider the annual cash flow. However, if the 
volatility is not specifically controlled, it will become a problem especially when the project is 
evaluated based on its monthly revenue, or debts be paid back at a monthly base. In those cases, 
the project owner would want to take monthly settlement strategies S3 or S4. 
2. Buyer’s Perspective 
Observation 4-4. Although for the four strategies, the buyer’s willingness is guaranteed though 
the non-regret constraint, the patterns of the buyer’s regret probabilities vary from each other.  
Figure 4-11 plots the non-regret probability of the buyer of the 12 months for each strategy. Since 
the strategy S1, S2 and S4 are based on an annual non-regret constraints, the volatility of the 
monthly probability is significant. Meanwhile, although the annual constraint is satisfied with the 
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50% threshold, the monthly non-regret probability could still be less than 50%. The means of the 
monthly non-regret probability for each strategy are also plotted in the Figure 4-11, with which 
strategy S4 have the highest probability, and strategy S2 derived the smallest probability. Strategy 
S3, on the other hand, has a very stable non-regret probability pattern. Since this strategy is made 
based on monthly settlement, all the monthly non-regret probabilities are forced to be at least 
50%. However, the average probability of strategy S3 is not as high as strategy S4 since the 
decision making for strategy S3 is trying to push the monthly probability towards 50% so as to 
share more benefit to the project owner.  
 
Figure 4-11 Buyer’s Non-regret Probability for Four Strategies 
3. Out-of-Sample Analysis — Actual Performance for 2013 
Out-of-sample is a procedure to analyze the strategy based on the actual data. As applied to our 
problem, the different strategies that we solved are based on the historic data from 2009 to 2012, 
now we are using the actual 2013 data to verify the expected result, and analyze the actual 
performance of the strategies we derived. 
Observation 4-5. The out-of-sample result is consistent with the expected performance, which 
justify the methodology and model building. 
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The actual value for the uncertain parameters Q and P are derived through the electricity market 
and the meteorology center database. As shown in the Figure 4-12, the estimation for the 
generation quantity has a better fit for the estimation for the electricity market price. Even though, 
the actual win IPP’s revenue and buyer’s savings follow the expected pattern as discussed 
previously (Figure 4-13).  
 
Figure 4-12 Actual VS Expected Value of Uncertain Parameters 
 




Observation 4-6. The relationship between the project owner and the energy buyer is not a zero-
sum game, instead, the revenue and risk control benefit can be shared through the contract terms 
thus realize a mutual surplus enhancement. 
As shown in Figure 4-13. The strategy S2 derives the best annual revenue for the project owner 
while the least savings for the buyer, and the strategy S3 and S4 get the better benefit for the 
buyer while sacrifice some of the project owner’s revenues. Meanwhile, assume 30% debt at 8% 
interest rate, 50% tax equity at 8.5% cost and 20% common equity at 12% cost, the average 
subsidized cost for the wind project is approximate $40/Mwh (LAZARD 2011), then the annual 
cost for the cape wind project for year 2013 is $6.37×107. Combining the revenue and the cost, 
we can get both parties’ profit through the project, as Table 4-9. Overall, strategy S4 obtains the 
highest overall surplus. 
Table 4-9 Surplus Sharing for the Seller and the Buyer 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
Seller's Surplus ($) 2.60E+06 2.87E+06 1.93E+06 2.45E+06 
Buyer's Surplus ($) 1.34E+06 1.07E+06 2.01E+06 2.10E+06 
Overall Surplus ($) 3.93E+06 3.94E+06 3.94E+06 4.56E+06 
4. Overall Evaluation for Different Strategies  
Observation 4-7. Among the four different contract design strategies, there is no one that 
exclusively outperforms. Instead, each of them has its advantage which depends on the need from 
the project owner and the buyer. 
Strategy S1 is the most straightforward strategy that is easy to execute. It obtains reasonable 
revenue cash flow, and depends the least on the information of the parameter estimation. Strategy 
S2 incorporate the stochastic nature of the parameters in the model, it is expected to improve the 
performance based on the additional information of the uncertainties. As a matter of fact, strategy 
S2 is expected to get the highest annual revenue among all the options, and improves the annual 
revenue volatility on strategy S1. Strategy S3 addresses the monthly settlement plan, with which 
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it largely enhance the risk control of the monthly cash flow on strategy S1 and S2, and stabilize 
the buyer’s non-regret probability above 50%. As a compromise, the strategy S3 sacrifices a 
small portion of the revenue. Strategy S4, at last, is a balance between the revenue and the risk 
control. It obtains higher expected revenue than strategy S3 and improve the annual CVaR of 
strategy S2. Both strategy S3 and S4 outperform at monthly revenue risk control by a large 
margin. Meanwhile, the strategy S4 provide the buyer the highest non-regret probability. 
In order to systematically evaluate the strategies, we define a five-fold score system, and calculate 
the normalized scores for all the five criteria. Among all the criteria, weights should be allocated 
between the easiness to execute the strategy and the strategy effectiveness. We take 0.3 and 0.7 as 
an example. Specifically, the measure criteria and the calculation references are summarized in 
the Table 4-10: 
 
 
Table 4-10 Strategy Evaluation Criteria and Score 
  
S1 S2 S3 S4 Calculation References 
Easy to Execute (weight 0.3) 30.000 26.667 23.333 20.000 







25.064 25.128 24.845 24.964 




24.716 24.971 25.232 25.080 
Normalized Negative 
Annual CVaR (Expected) 
Monthly 
Risk Control 
14.801 14.907 35.482 34.810 
Normalized Reverse 
Monthly CVaR  (Expected) 
Buyer's 
Satisfaction 
19.940 18.899 29.911 31.250 
Normalized Buyer's Non-
regret Probability (Expected) 
Total Score 68.17 66.73 87.83 87.27 
 
 
According to the result, the strategy S3 ranks the first, strategy S4 second, strategy S1 the third, 
and strategy S2 the last. Since strategy S3 and S4 does not have substantial difference between 
each other, they can be regarded as alternatives, and recommended as the improvement for 
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traditional strategy S1. Although strategy S2 enhances a small margin of the S1 in terms of the 
revenue and risk control, it is not recommended as a replacement mainly due to the additional 
computational burden and buyer’s benefit loss (Figure 4-14).  
 
Figure 4-14 Strategy Evaluation Result 
4.7 Conclusions 
In this section, we consider the long-term offtake strategy through bilateral PPA contract for wind 
projects. Four different strategies are proposed for different emphasis with regard to settlement 
schedule, performance-based contract terms, and buyer’s non-regret attitude. Applying the 
strategies to the Cape Wind case study, the analytical solutions for all different strategies are 
obtained through Genetic Algorithm and stochastic programming. The performances of the 
strategies are then evaluated through the solutions and the out-of-sample analysis. The strategy S3 
and S4 which are more focused on monthly cash flow risk control are recommended as the 








Chapter 5.  Hybrid Offtake Strategy Design for Wind Project 
5.1 Introduction 
According to the previous two chapters, wind IPP should either choose a short-term offtake to the 
spot market, or sign long-term PPA with purchasers, but there is no flexibility to opt between the 
two. Although some large wind projects are divided into small sub-projects, and are allocated to 
different offtake strategies, the wind IPP still have no control over the offtake approach for each 
sub-project. In an uncertain circumstance, however, it is important to hold options during the 
operation so as to balance or hedge against different scenarios for the volatile exogenous factors 
(Birge and Louveaux 2011).  
As we discussed in chapter three and chapter four, the short-term and long-term strategies have 
their own pros and cons. The short-term strategy is very sensitive to the stochastic parameters, 
thus is able to take advantage of the fluctuation at a very short hourly base and is able to capture 
the revenues that are expectedly maximized. However, the stochastic nature of the electricity 
market and the wind resource result in a high volatility of the cash flow, thus bring extra 
uncertainties of the project feasibility and profitability. The risks from the unstable cash flow are 
the main concerns which prevent many wind IPPs from choosing the short-term strategy. The 
long-term strategy, on the contrary, is mainly designed for controlling the long-term cash flow 
risks. The volatility is reduced due to the contract terms such as the price and the quantity that are 
set as fixed for a month or even a year. As a result, the long-term strategy is effective in 
stabilizing the cash flow while sacrificing the revenue. Although each strategy is optimized in the 
previous two chapters, the possibility to combine the two strategies is not yet considered. If both 
strategies can be effectively integrated, the disadvantages are expected to be offset by the 
advantages, which will result in a better balance between the revenue and risks. 
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In this Chapter, an extended hybrid model will be presented, which enables wind IPPs to establish 
a more flexible mechanism for the electricity production offtake combining the short-term and 
long-term strategies. A two level stochastic model will be built, with the first level to design the 
PPA contract with detailed terms before the project starts, and the second level to optimize the 
allocation of the energy production between the PPA and the spot market. This recourse process 
will enable the project developer to take into consideration the uncertainties of the weather and 
the power market during the operation, and plan contract design and negotiation accordingly. 
5.2 Two-Level Decision Making for the Hybrid Offtake Strategy 
The designing for the hybrid offtake can be regarded as a two-level problem, where the first level 
is to design the long-term PPA contract, and the second level is to figure out the best short-term 
offtake strategy at each time point given the contract. The idea is that with the contract signed for 
the multiple years, the project developer has the flexibility to allocate his generation both to the 
long-term PPA, and to the spot market, at the real time hourly decision making. This gives the 
developer the right to adjust his real-time strategy based on the updated estimation for the 
stochastic variables, while the PPA take the flexibility into consideration, and will guarantee the 
right for both parties.  
The two-level problem is a special case for multilevel programming (MLP), which describes a 
decentralized decision system where there are a leader and followers. Both the leader and 
followers have their own decision variables and objective functions, and the leader can only 
influence the reactions of followers through his own decision variables, while the followers have 
full authority to decide how to optimize their own objective functions in view of the decisions of 
the leader and other followers (Liu 2009).  
As an analogy to the MLP, our two level decision-making problem describe the developer’s 
hybrid strategy making process where the PPA contract is designed in the first level as a here-
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and-now decision before knowing the stochastic parameters, and the short-term bidding strategy 
in the spot market of the second level is to be designed as an approximate wait-and-see decision, 
with more information available (Birge and Louveaux 2011, Carrión, Conejo, and Arroyo 2007). 
The contract design of the first level is regarded as a one-time decision making, while the 
operation strategies for the short-term market bidding are time-varying dynamic decision making. 
The two-level model can be a good fit to treat the different procedures. 
As analyzed in the chapter four, the strategy S3 of the PPA contract design with monthly design 
has the overall best performance, hence we assume the wind IPP will go for the monthly PPA 
settlement in this hybrid strategy. Furthermore, we assume that within one month, the daily 
pattern of the wind speed and the electricity market are following the same distribution. With this 
assumption, the monthly problem can further be approximately decomposed to 30 same daily 
strategy. Finally, the monthly hybrid problem will be treated as duplicated daily strategies, which 
are composed of a daily settlement PPA contract offtake plus 24 hourly bidding strategy for spot 
market offtake.  
The two-phase problem can be written as the following general form (5-1). The first phase is the 
grand problem, which is to decide the terms of the PPA contract so as to maximize the total daily 
revenue, given the CVaR constrain as risk control and non-regret chance constraint as the buyer’s 
attitude. The decision variable for the first phase are the daily PPA term variables (?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅), 
while the short-term strategy 𝑢(𝑡), 𝑡 = 1,… 24 for the hourly bidding are provided as parameters 
solved through the second phase. In the second phase, the developer is given the contract with 
parameters of (?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅), hence the problem is to make the best hourly bidding decision about the 
allocation of the generation amount delivering between the spot market and the PPA contract. 
After obtaining the solution for the daily solution, the monthly contract terms can be directly 
calculated as (?̅?, 30 × ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅), and the bidding strategies for the 24 hours are duplicated for 30 
days as the monthly short-term strategy. 
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𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑢
∗(𝑡), 𝑥∗(𝑡) ) , 𝑡 = 1,…𝑇
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜                                                      
                                          
𝜙𝛽(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑢
∗(𝑡), 𝑥∗(𝑡)) ≤ 𝑤                                              






 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂
̅̅ ̅,  𝑢(𝑡), 𝑥(𝑡)), 𝑡 = 1,…𝑇        
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜                                                                     
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠                                       
   
 (5-1) 
Where  
?̅? —Daily electricity price, equals to the Monthly contract price signed in PPA 
?̅? —Daily delivery amount, equals to the 1/30 monthly delivery amount signed in PPA  
𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ —Daily outperformance price, equals to the Monthly outperformance price signed in PPA 
𝑢(𝑡) —Hourly electricity amount bidding in the spot market 
𝑥(𝑡) —Daily quota realization at time t 
𝑇—Total number of hours in the effective period of the contract 
For the second level problem, an affine controller will be used to solve the time varying dynamic 
procedure, which assumes that the decision variable is affine to the system output. Applied this 
problem, the bidding amount for each hour is assumed to be affine to the electricity that has been 
delivered to the PPA buyer. Given the assumption, the second level problem can obtain a unique 
analytical solution, which is the bidding strategies for each hour every day, with a specific 
contract. Detailed mathematical procedure for the affined controller will be discussed separately 
in the following section. 
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With the second level solved, the first level problem is essentially trying to find a good design for 
the contract terms, so that the overall revenue could be maximized. Meanwhile, similar to the 
previous two chapters, a chance-constraint is used to depict the PPA buyer’s non-regret attitude. 
Therefore, a chance-constraint based Genetic Algorithm (GA) will be used to deal with the 
iterative search. The GA has been applied in many optimal control problems, and is able to obtain 
the global optimal solution fairly especially when the optimization problem has multimodal 
objective functions or irregular search spaces (Holland 1975, Glodberg 1989, Liu 2009). The 
framework for the GA process is similar to the one summarized in chapter 4. 
5.3 Second Level Short-term Bidding Strategy using Affine Controller 
5.3.1 Second-level Optimization Problem 
We first consider the second level problem, which is an hourly dynamic problem. The central idea 
is to decide the bidding amount in the spot market for each hour, and the remaining of the 
generation will be selling to the long-term buyer, which is fed into the monthly quota of the PPA 
contract. Although the hourly revenues from the spot market are independent, which is only based 
on the actual generation amount for each hour, the strategy associated with the PPA are time 
varying as a dynamic process. There is a monthly quantity pre-determined in the contract, which 
can be regarded as a fix quota for the project developer. At the end of each month, the revenue is 
settled based on the accumulated delivery amount from each hour comparing with the quota. 
Therefore, the bidding strategies for each hour not only have the impact on the hourly revenue 
from the spot market, but also on the final monthly revenue from the PPA contract.  
Meanwhile, with the assumption that in one month, the stochastic parameters for each day are 
following the same pattern, the monthly strategy can be transferred to a daily 24-hour decision 
making. Figure 5-1 illustrates the process of a daily decision making. 
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At each hour, the developer should decide on the bidding amount 𝑢(𝑡) in the DA market, when 
the actual generation is realized, the wind IPP will be settled at the RT market, with regard to the 
day-ahead LMP 𝑃𝐷𝐴(𝑡), real-time LMP 𝑃𝑅𝑇(𝑡), and day-ahead bidding amount 𝑢(𝑡). Different 
with the settling scheme discussed in chapter 3, we make the following assumptions as the market 
rules to ensure a fair and manageable market with this hybrid strategy existing: 
(1) Due to the reliability concern, the wind producer can only bid at the day-ahead market with 
the amount less than the expected generation amount. 
(2) For the sake of reliability, with a hybrid strategy-taking IPP, if the actual generation is more 
than the day-ahead bidding amount, the actual delivery should be equal to the bidding amount. 
Instead, the remaining electricity should be delivered to the bilateral contract buyer. 
(3) If the actual generation is less than what the IPP bids in the day-ahead market, the difference 
will be settled as a negative balance with the real-time market price. 
With the assumptions, the hourly revenue can be written as: 
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 = 𝑃𝐷𝐴(𝑡) ∙ 𝑢(𝑡) + 𝑃𝑅𝑇(𝑡) ∙ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ((𝑄(𝑡) − 𝑢(𝑡)), 0) (5-2) 
Therefore, the daily revenue from the spot market is: 









Figure 5-1 Dynamic Offtake Control during the Project Operation 
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Then for each hour, the remaining electricity will be delivered to the PPA buyer. The settlement 
with the PPA buyer is different with that of the spot market. Since we assume that the monthly 
settlement can be converted to a daily settlement, the revenue from the PPA contract will be 
settled at a daily-bases. The hourly decision for the delivery to the PPA buyer is not independent. 
Instead, it should consider forward steps till the end of the day. It is a dynamic control problem, 
with hourly step written as: 
𝑥(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((𝑄(𝑡) − 𝑢(𝑡)), 0) , 𝑡 = 0,… , 𝑇 − 1 
Where 𝑥(𝑡) means at the beginning of the tth hour, how much is the amount of the daily quota that 
has been fulfilled. At each hour, the amount will be adjusted to that from the previous hour, and 
the delivery from the actual generation minus the amount that is sold at the spot market. 
At the end of the day, the daily revenue from the PPA contract is settled based on the contract 
terms ?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅. With the contract, the promised quantity ?̅? will firstly be settled with price ?̅?, if 
the actual delivery is more than ?̅?, then the difference will be settled by the outperformance price 
𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, while if the delivery is not fulfilled, then the wind IPP should pay for a penalty based on the 
average market price. Therefore, the daily revenue from the PPA contract can be written as: 
𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑃𝑃𝐴
= ?̅? × ?̅? + 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ × 𝑚𝑎𝑥((𝑥(𝑇) − ?̅?), 0) + 𝑃𝑅𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ × 𝑚𝑖𝑛((𝑥(𝑇) − ?̅?), 0) 
(5-4) 
With the dynamic transition function and revenue function defined, the general form for the 
second-level optimization problem can be written as: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 {∑[𝑃𝐷𝐴(𝑡) × 𝑢(𝑡) + 𝑃𝑅𝑇(𝑡) ×𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑄(𝑡) − 𝑢(𝑡), 0)]
𝑇
𝑡=0
+ ?̅? × ?̅? + 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅






) ×𝑚𝑖𝑛((𝑥(𝑇) − ?̅?), 0)} 
(5-5) 
𝑠. 𝑡.                                                                                                
 𝑥(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((𝑄(𝑡) − 𝑢(𝑡)), 0) , 𝑡 = 0,… , 𝑇 − 1 (5-6) 
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5.3.2 Model Setup and Solving Method 
The model is mathematically hard to solve due to the complicated characteristics of the dynamic 
control as well as the stochastic parameters. Therefore, we are going to make a simplified 
assumption of a so-called affine controller to deal with the dynamic process. In that system, the 
output feedback controller 𝑢(𝑡) is assumed to be affine to the system outputs, in the form of 
𝑢(𝑡) = 𝜑𝑡(𝑥(0), … , 𝑥(𝑡)), 𝑡 = 1,2…𝑇 − 1 , in which the functions 𝜑𝑡  are affine. The affine 
controller design problem is not convex in its original form, but it can be converted through some 
mathematical transformation into an equivalent convex optimization problem, which makes the 
problem solvable.  
(Skaf and Boyd 2010) firstly present the methodology, and propose to use the classical Q-design 
procedure to transform the complicated non-convex problem to a solvable convex problem. 
Detailed proof and mathematical process are summarized in the Appendix B. To deal with the 
stochastic parameters in the model, a Monte Carlo simulation process needs to be utilized as an 
approximation for the objectives or the constraints whichever are uncertain in nature (Skaf and 
Boyd 2010, Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004). Applying the methodology, it is able to get the 
analytical solution of the second-level problem. 
Before applying the methodology of affine controller, we first need to adjust the model so as to 
transform the formation of the program. Firstly, for the max function in the objective, we add a 
hard constraint of 𝑢(𝑡) ≤ 𝑄(𝑡), which will force the bidding amount less than the possible 
generation amount. Therefore, the max part 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((𝑄(𝑡) − 𝑢(𝑡)), 0) in the system transition 
function can be approximated as 𝑄(𝑡) − 𝑢(𝑡). For the sake of mathematical solvability, it is a 
stricter constraint than which is assumed previously. Nevertheless, it actually makes sense 
especially considering that the IPP will try to sell part of the generation to the short-term market, 
and a stricter self-constraint will be more convincing from the market manger’s perspective.  
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To deal with the min function, we define a new variable of 𝑛(𝑇), where 𝑛(𝑇) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑥(𝑇), ?̅?). 
Then the items in the objective and constraint functions can be substituted as: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥((𝑥(𝑇) − ?̅?), 0) = 𝑥(𝑇) − 𝑛(𝑇) 
𝑚𝑖𝑛((𝑥(𝑇) − ?̅?), 0) = 𝑛(𝑇) − ?̅? 
Since part of the objective is to maximize 𝑛(𝑡), then in the constraint, 𝑛(𝑡) can be forced to equal 
the 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑥(𝑇), ?̅?). Meanwhile, another two constraints of 𝑛(𝑇) ≤ 𝑥(𝑇), and 𝑛(𝑇) ≤ ?̅? should 
be added accordingly. In order to be consistent with the notation of the (Skaf and Boyd 2010), we 
redefined the notation 𝑊(𝑡) = 𝑄(𝑡) as the actual hourly generation amount, which is a stochastic 
variable in this problem. The final model that is ready for the affine controller programming is 
expressed as (5-7), where for a daily problem, T=24: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 {∑[𝑃𝐷𝐴(𝑡) × 𝑢(𝑡)]
𝑇−1
𝑡=1







) × (𝑛(𝑇) − ?̅?)} 
(5-7) 
𝑠. 𝑡.                                                                                                
𝑥(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑥(𝑡) +𝑊(𝑡) − 𝑢(𝑡), 𝑡 = 0,… , 𝑇 − 1 
𝑢(𝑡) ≤ 𝑊(𝑡), 𝑡 = 0,… , 𝑇 − 1 
𝑛(𝑇) ≤ 𝑥(𝑇) 
𝑛(𝑇) ≤ ?̅? 
5.3.3 Affine Controller and Simulation 
We now apply the affine controller to the model, detailed mathematical proof are summarized in 




𝑥 = 𝐺𝑤 + 𝐻𝑢 + 𝑥0 






































When the causal feedback controller is defined as affine to the outputs from the previous steps, 
and the Q-design procedure is applied, the decision variables can be further written as: 
𝑥 = (𝐼 + 𝐻𝑄)𝐺𝑊 + (𝐼 + 𝐻𝑄)𝑥0 +𝐻𝑟 
𝑢 = 𝑄(𝐺𝑊 + 𝑥0) + 𝑟 
The decision variable of the problem become 𝑄 and 𝑟, and the 𝑄 is a lower triangular matrix. The 
problem itself will be transformed to a convex optimization program (Boyd and Vandenberghe 
2004) thus can be solved efficiently. Once the problem is solved, as well as the actual generation 
amount 𝑊 is given for the specific periods, the bidding amount in the wholesale market 𝑢(𝑡) and 
the corresponding accumulated PPA fulfillment 𝑥(𝑡) can be calculated. 
Furthermore, since 𝑃𝐷𝐴(𝑡), 𝑃𝑅𝑇(𝑡),𝑊(𝑡) are all stochastic variables and all having continuous 
distribution, according to (Skaf and Boyd 2010), we have to approximate the problem by 
sampling from those parameters’ distributions. For sampling M times, the objective function can 
be replaced by the empirical mean, and the constraints are expanded accordingly. Therefore, the 




















) × (𝑛(𝑗)(𝑇) − ?̅?)} 
(5-8) 
 




𝑛(𝑗)(𝑇) ≤ 𝑥(𝑗)(𝑇) 
𝑛(𝑗)(𝑇) ≤ ?̅? 
𝑥(𝑗) = (𝐼 + 𝐻𝑄)𝐺𝑊(𝑗) + (𝐼 + 𝐻𝑄)𝑥0 +𝐻𝑟 
𝑢(𝑗) = 𝑄(𝐺𝑊(𝑗) + 𝑥0) + 𝑟 
Substituting 𝑥 and 𝑢 to the program, the model becomes a linear stochastic program, with the 
number of the decision variables as T(T+1)/2+T+M. Although the scale of the problem is largely 
enlarged with the increase of parameter T and M, the problem is still solvable through the 
commercially available software. 
5.4 First Level Long-term PPA Design using Genetic Algorithm (GA) 
5.4.1 First Level Optimization Problem 
Given the short-term bidding strategy solved with specific contract terms, the first level problem 
is to iteratively evaluate the contract terms to find the best design for the PPA so that overall 
profit is optimized. The iterative search procedure can be illustrated through the following Figure 
5-2. As shown in the figure, every time the contract term is provided for one PPA contract (first 
level), the short-term strategy (second level) will be decided based on the contract terms, as well 
as the estimation of the stochastic variables. The short-term strategy directly decide how the 
future cash flow will look like, given the sampling from the stochastic variables 𝑊(𝑡). Hence the 
solution of the second level problem can be regarded as a feedback to the first level about the 
expected revenue. The objective of the first level problem is to iteratively search for a better 




Figure 5-2 Feedback Loop for the First Level Decision Making  
Meanwhile, similar to the previous two chapters, two constraints are added in the first level 
searching. The first one is the CVaR constraint, regarded as the risk control module, and the 
second one is the chance-constraint, depicting the buyer’s no-regret decision making. The first 













) ×𝑚𝑖𝑛((𝑥(𝑇) − ?̅?), 0)
 (5-9) 
𝑠. 𝑡.                                                                                                
 𝜙𝛽(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑄𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝑅𝑇) ≤ 𝑤 (5-10) 
 𝑝𝑟(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟(𝑃𝑃𝐴) − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) ≤ 0) ≥ 𝑎 (5-11) 
?̅? ≥ 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ 




 𝑢 = 𝑄∗(𝐺𝑊 + 𝑥0) + 𝑟
∗  
 𝑄∗, 𝑟∗ 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚  
Similar as processed in the last chapter, the (5-9) and (5-10) can be combined as an equivalent 
objective function: 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝛽(𝑥, 𝛼)−𝜇𝑅(𝑥) , 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝜇 ≥ 0, 𝑇 = 24 (5-12) 
Where  
𝐹𝛽(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅, 𝑄𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝑅𝑇 , 𝑃𝐷𝐴, 𝛼)  
= (1 − 𝛽)−1 × ∭ {−𝑅(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅) − 𝛼}





𝑡      𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑡 > 0,
0      𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑡 ≤ 0.
 
And 
𝑅(?̅?, ?̅?, 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅) = ∑[𝑃𝐷𝐴(𝑡) × 𝑢(𝑡)]
𝑇−1
𝑡=0







×𝑚𝑖𝑛((𝑥(𝑇) − ?̅?), 0) 
The chance constraint (5-11) is the no-regret constraint for the buyer. In specific, for a monthly 
decision, there is only one constraint that check the buyer’s no-regret probability. Let buyer’s 




?̅? ∙ ?̅? + 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥((∑(𝑄𝑅𝑇 − 𝑢(𝑡))
𝑇−1
𝑡=0




























Combined, the chance-constraint of buyer’s no-regret can be written as (5-13), with which 𝑎 is set 
as the confidence level for buyer’s decision making.  
𝑃𝑟(?̅? ∙ ?̅? + 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ ∙ 𝑚𝑎𝑥((∑(𝑄𝑅𝑇 − 𝑢(𝑡))
𝑇−1
𝑡=0















∑[𝑃𝑅𝑇(𝑡) ∙ (𝑄𝑅𝑇 − 𝑢(𝑡))]
𝑇−1
𝑡=0
≤ 0) ≥ 𝑎 
(5-13) 
5.4.2 Genetic Algorithm (GA) and Simulation 
Similar to the chapter four, the GA framework can be established to conduct the iterative search. 
Meanwhile, the simulation procedure is also similar, where the parameter of 𝑃𝐷𝐴(𝑡), 𝑃𝑟𝑡(𝑡) and 

















] , 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝜇
≥ 0, 𝑇 = 24 
(5-14) 
Where 




+ ?̅? × ?̅? + 𝑃𝑂̅̅ ̅ × 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ((𝑥









) ×𝑚𝑖𝑛 ((𝑥(𝑘)(𝑇) − ?̅?), 0) 
(5-15) 
The value for the chance constraint is the frequency with which the current solution satisfies the 
constraints. Let 𝑛 be the number of random vectors that satisfy the chance constraints. Then with 






With all the model ready for the algorithm, the GA can be solved with the parameters set up as 
Table 5-1: 
Table 5-1 Parameters for Stochastic GA Programming Setup 
Number of Variable, N 4 
Size of Population, K=10*N 40 
Number of Generation, G=10*K 400 
Number of Sampling, Omega 100 
Probability of Crossover, Pc 0.7 
Probability of Mutation, Pm 0.1 
5.5 Case Study for Cape Wind Project 
The Cape Wind project will be discussed again in this chapter. The data is to be processed at a 
daily based, while assuming the market price and wind resource are following the same daily 
pattern within one month. Therefore, the monthly regression is based on the hourly data collected 
for the same month. For example, the wind speed for the first hour of the 31 days in January from 
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2009 to 2012 will be collected to conduct the Weibull regression, and thus form the sampling 
seed for the first hour of 31 days in January for year 2013. The procedure also apply to the day-
ahead and real-time market price, while the distributions are assumed to be normal. 
With Ω  samples generated, the GA programming are run which calls the affine controller 
programming as the second level solution, evaluate the chance-constraint and calculate the 
objective for pop-size times. The evolving procedure will be conducted for Generation times to 
find the best PPA contract design which minimize the weight sum of the CVaR and the negative 
total revenue, and satisfies the buyer’s non-regret constraint. Meanwhile, the short-term bidding 
strategy will also be found through the second level dynamic feedback system. In the end, the 
model will output a hybrid strategy which enables the project IPP to simultaneously manage the 
long-term and short-term offtake. 
5.5.1 Long-term PPA Solution with Hybrid Strategy 
The solution for each month’s offtake strategy is separately obtained through 400 Generations of 
GA evolving process. Figure 5-3 takes January as an example and shows the progressing of the 
solutions through the evolution procedure.  
Observation 5.1 With the 400 generations, the decision variables start with a high volatility in the 
searching area, get stabilized after around the 200th generation, and progressively moving towards 
the optimized solution from the 280th generation. With the ultimate objective progressing towards 




Figure 5-3 Evolution Procedure for GA Programming (Jan) 
It is worth notice that the solution obtained from the programming is for the daily PPA. In order 
to convert to the optimized monthly PPA design for the total project, the electricity delivery 
quantity should be adjusted with the number of days for the month, the number of wind turbines 
for the project, as well as the units.  
As a result, the contract terms design for the whole year 2013 are summarized as in Table 5-2 and 
Figure 5-4. 
Table 5-2 Solution for PPA Contract Terms 
Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Contract Price ($) 48.64 41.99 40.15 34.83 36.15 38.54 
Contract Quantity (kwh) 118 125 102 98.4 82.8 64.8 
Contract 
Outperformance Price ($) 
6.35 8.35 2.13 1.19 2.55 2.79 
Month 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Contract Price ($) 36.12 37.38 40.12 38.65 35.64 41.37 
Contract Quantity (kwh) 67.3 68.4 92.4 122 129 136 
Contract 
Outperformance Price ($) 




Figure 5-4 Long-term Decision for PPA Contract 
Observation 5.2 Different with the single PPA strategy, with the hybrid strategy, both the 
contract price and the contract delivery amount are signed as smaller than the expected market 
parameters. 
As shown in the figure, the wind IPPs only takeoff part of their generation capacity using long-
term PPA contract, so that they can use the remaining capacity to take advantage of the short-
term wholesale market offtake. The proportion of the contract amount over the expected 
generation capacity is in average 75%, with the range of [66%, 85%]. That means about one-
quarter of the generation capacity are expected to be sold through the wholesale market.  
Meanwhile, in order to obtain the flexibility of allocation between the two types of strategies, the 
wind IPP is willing to sign lower contract price for PPA buyer than expected market price. 
Furthermore, the outperformance price is very small since the IPP has high flexibility to sell the 
redundant amount to the market but not to the PPA buyer. The lower outperformance price can be 
treated as a good negotiating point when the buyer is considering their no-regret possibilities. 
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Observation 5.3 As to the profit sharing between the IPP and the buyer, better contract design 
from the IPP’s perspective means that the buyer is pushed to their threshold for accepting the 
contract.  
As shown in Figure 5-5 taking January as the example, with the genetic searching evolving, the 
no-regret probability starts with high volatility and remains in high values. When the GA 
programming starts to progress to the optimization after around 300th generation, the no-regret 
probability is pushed towards the threshold 50%. Similar to the single PPA design, the threshold 
of the chance constraint is an important negotiation point as a benefit sharing parameter.   
 
Figure 5-5 GA Result for No-regret Probability (Jan.) 
5.5.2 Short-term Bidding with Hybrid Strategy 
The short-term dynamic control strategy is solved together with the long-term strategy 
simultaneously. As a result, with the optimized contract terms found, the optimal short-term 
bidding strategy are solved through the affine controller optimization problem. It is worth 
mention that the second level problem does not provide a fixed bidding amount 𝑢(𝑡), instead, it 
solves an optimal so-called close-loop matrix 𝑄  and 𝑟 . So that given the actual input of the 
stochastic variable 𝑊 , the bidding amount 𝑢(𝑡) and the PPA delivery 𝑥(𝑡) can be calculated 
accordingly. Without knowing the actual generation amount, we first refer to the 100 samples 
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from the sampling seeds to check the strategy and its expected results, then actual performance of 
the strategy design will be discussed using out-of-sample analysis.  
We respectively gather five best and five worst strategy designs based on their objective values. 
Figure 5-6 shows the expected mean and variance of the bidding amount, and demonstrates the 
effectiveness of the strategy design. 
Observation 5.4 With better strategy design, the short-term bidding is able to capture the trend of 
the market price so as to take advantage of the price volatility. Meanwhile, better strategies are 
more stable and robust, which are not easily influenced by the stochastic variable input. 
As shown in the figure, the bidding amount of the five best strategies have higher covariance with 
the expected market price. As a result, the electricity allocation to the wholesale market could 
bring higher revenue. On the contrary, the worse strategies are more random in terms of the 
bidding amount, which is not relevant to the expected market price. Therefore, even with the 
same total bidding amount, the revenue are expected to be lower.  
The robustness of the strategy can be reflected from the variance of the bidding amount. A better 
strategy design takes the stochasticity into consideration when the decision is made, while during 
the operation phase, the actual execution of the strategy is under better control. This can be 





Figure 5-6 Different Strategy Design for Short-term Bidding 
Similarly, continuous PPA delivery amount can also be calculated given the close-loop matrix 𝑄 
and 𝑟 solved through the program. With the 100 samples, the expected mean of the hourly and 
accumulated electricity delivery to the PPA buyer for January are shown in Figure 5-7. 
 
Figure 5-7 Hourly and Accumulated Electricity Delivery to PPA Buyer (Jan.) 
Observation 5.4 The IPP always choose to deliver less than the expected generation, so as to be 
conservative to avoid paying for the penalty, or getting paid for the outperformance, which is 
much less than the market price.  
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Unlike the single PPA contract when the redundant electricity have to be sold with a lower 
outperformance price, the hybrid strategy enables the IPP to better allocate the generation 
between the two options thus maximize the revenue. In this sense, the PPA offtake of the hybrid 
mechanism has realized the “storage” role that provides complementary buffers to the short-term 
offtake. 
With both offtakes amount allocated, the expected mean of the total revenue and CVaR can be 
calculated associated with the 100 samples. Figure 5-8, Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 summarize the 
allocation of the revenues and CVaR from the two offtake channels.  
Observation 5.5 The long-term and short-term offtake are expected to contribute differently in 
terms of the revenue and CVaR, thus balancing the trade-off between revenue and risk. 
As shown in Figure 5-8, the total monthly revenue follow the similar seasonal trend as discussed 
in the previous two chapters. As a result, the expected annual revenue is $7.13E+07, of which the 
revenue from the long-term offtake is expected to be $5.06E+07, accounting for 71%, and that 
from the short-term offtake is expected to be $2.08E+07, accounting for 29%. This ratio 
corresponds with the delivery amount allocation, which is 75% to 25%, due to the higher unit 
revenue from the wholesale market. 
 
Figure 5-8 Expected Monthly Revenue Allocation 
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As to the revenue cash flow risks, the CVaR for the long-term offtake is kept at a low level, 
which is favored due to its low volatility as promised by the contract terms. On the other hand, 
the CVaR from the wholesale market is high as expected due to the uncertainty of the market 
price. In specific, the relative CVaR for the short-term offtake, long-term offtake and total 
revenue, which is defined as the ratio of the CVaR divided by the expected revenue, are 
respectively -15%, -59%, and -47%. Thus the CVaR for the total revenue is the balance between 
the two offtake strategies. 
Table 5-3 Monthly CVaR for Offtake Revenue Allocation 
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
Short-term Offtake -2.54E+05 -1.60E+05 -2.13E+05 -1.10E+05 -1.41E+05 -1.16E+05 
Long-term Offtake -2.51E+06 -4.98E+06 -5.84E+06 -2.65E+06 -2.85E+06 -1.79E+06 
Total Offtake -2.82E+06 -5.22E+06 -6.12E+06 -2.82E+06 -3.02E+06 -1.94E+06 
Month Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Short-term Offtake -9.69E+04 -1.57E+05 -1.00E+05 -2.08E+05 -1.69E+05 -3.92E+05 
Long-term Offtake -1.53E+06 -1.92E+06 -3.13E+06 -2.59E+06 -2.02E+06 -4.33E+06 
Total Offtake -1.70E+06 -2.11E+06 -3.32E+06 -2.86E+06 -2.25E+06 -4.94E+06 
Table 5-4 CVaR for Annual and Monthly Revenue 
 






Short-term Offtake -1.65E+05 -3.09E+06 -15% 
Long-term Offtake -3.44E+06 -4.14E+07 -59% 
Total Offtake -3.66E+06 -3.47E+07 -47% 
5.5.3 Out-of-Sample Analysis——Performance of the Hybrid Offtake Strategy 
With the optimized strategies solved, we take the real data from the year 2013 to conduct an out-
of-sample analysis, so as to validate the effectiveness and efficiency of the model.  
Observation 5.6 With the hybrid strategy, the wind IPP is more resilient to deal with the volatility 
of the stochastic parameters.   
Figure 5-9 summarize the realization of some parameters comparing with the expected value. As 
shown in the figure, with the option of delivering to the wholesale market, the actual delivery can 
be kept close to the promised contract quantity, so as to avoid losses due to the underperformance 
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or outperformance. The deviations of the delivery comparing with the contract amount are in the 
small range of [10%, 11%]. 
 
Figure 5-9 Actual Parameter V.S. Expected Value of Year 2013 
As a result, the revenue from the long-term offtake, the PPA contract does not deviate much from 
the expected value. As shown in the Figure 5-10, most of the volatilities are digested through the 
short-term offtake.   
 
Figure 5-10 Actual Revenue V.S. Expected Revenue of Year 2013 
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Observation 5.7 As to the profit sharing, since the hybrid strategy enables the IPP to control the 
long-term delivery amount very close as promised in the contract, the buyer’s savings from the 
PPA mainly rely on the difference of the actual electricity price and the contract price. The 
uncertain part of the IPP’s revenue is also associated with the volatility market price. 
As shown in the Figure 5-11, for the months that the actual market price is higher than the 
contract price, the buyer’s saving is obvious, while the buyer also takes risks for the months that 
the actual price is lower. Overall, the buyer could expected a stable unit cost from the contract, 
while the savings depend on the accuracy of market estimation when the contract is signed. 
 
Figure 5-11 PPA Buyer’s Monthly Profit 
Meanwhile, from the IPP’s perspective, since the delivery and price for the long-term offtake is 
pretty certain, the main uncertainty of the revenue still comes from the short-term offtake. 
However, since the short-term strategy only accounts about 25% of the total offtake, the volatility 
of the total cash flow are still under control. 
Assuming the project capital cost is with 30% debt at 8.0% interest rate, 50% tax equity at 8.5% 
cost and 20% common equity at 12% cost, the average subsidized cost for the wind project is 
approximate $40/Mwh (LAZARD 2011), then the annual cost for the Cape Wind project for year 
2013 is about $6.37×107. Since the cost is mainly capital cost, we assume the cost will be evenly 
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distributed throughout every month, hence the monthly cost will be $5.57×106. Combining the 
revenue and the cost, we can get both parties’ and overall surplus, as shown in Figure 5-12. 
 
Figure 5-12 Surplus for Different Stakeholders of the Project (Year 2013)  
Observation 5.8 The IPP and the PPA buyer are essentially sharing the benefits and surpluses. 
The total surplus shows a significant seasonal trend that is associated with the project’s 
generation.  
Although there are several months in which the project itself, as well as the overall benefit, is in 
red, the total investment return for the whole year is positive and as high as 12.05% (Table 5-5). 











1.05E+07 2.87E+06 7.68E+06 6.37E+07 12.05% 
5.6 Performance Comparison — Short-term, Long-term and Hybrid 
With all three strategies defined and solved through different methodologies and program setup, 
the last task is to compare the performance of these three in terms of their expected revenue and 
risks, as well as their actual performance through the out-of-sample analysis. In the chapter three 
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to five, since the three strategies are all applied to the Cape Wind project and sharing the same 
sampling seeds, we assume that the results are comparable. Therefore, we are going to re-
organize the calculation and statistical analysis throughout the three chapters and draw 
corresponding observations. 
In specific, we are going to compare the results of the proposed short-term and hybrid strategies, 
and as to the long-term strategy, we are going to take both S2 and S3 considering the different 
preferences from the project developer as well as the industrial policies. 
5.6.1 Expected Annual Revenue and Cash Flow Volatility 
Observation 5.9 As summarized in the Figure 5-13, short-term strategy obtains the highest 
expected annual revenue, while long-term strategy get the best performance of controlling the 
cash flow volatility, in term of the lowest annual CVaR. The hybrid strategy, as expected, 
balances the revenue and the risk. 
We use a metric called normalized annual CVaR, defined as |
𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑉𝑎𝑅
𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
|%, to intuitively 
represent the expected shape of future revenue. For each strategy, the normalized annual CVaR 
are respectively 19%, 82%, 84%, and 49%. 
 
Figure 5-13 Annual Revenue and CVaR for Strategy Comparison  
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Observation 5.10 Different risk attitude of the project owner will lead to different selection for 
the offtake strategies. Risk averse IPPs would favor long-term PPA offtake, risk taker will go for 
short-term offtake, while risk neutral IPPs would choose the hybrid offtake. 
Figure 5-14 demonstrate the efficient frontier of the weighted value for revenue minus CVaR 
with regard to the wind IPP’s risk attitude. The risk attitude is defined as the weight of the 
owner’s favor for annual revenue. As shown in the figure, from ratio changing from 3:1 to 20:1, 
the IPP will change from long-term offtake to hybrid offtake, to short-term offtake. For ratios that 
are less than 3:1, all IPPs will choose long-term strategy, and some will favor long-term S3 to S2. 
 
Figure 5-14 Efficient Frontier of Wind IPPs’ Strategy Selection 
5.6.2 Expected Monthly Revenue and Cash Flow Volatility 
Monthly revenue and cash flow volatility are of more interest when the project finance is 
evaluated based on monthly payback. For different strategies, the expected monthly cash flow 
and CVaR are plotted in Figure 5-15.  
Observation 5.11 Similar to the annual trend, the hybrid strategy acts a trade-off both for the 
monthly revenue and CVaR. The short-term offtake generate the highest monthly revenue, but 
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also embrace the highest risks. It is worth notice that although the monthly revenue for the two 
long-term strategies S1 and S3 are similar, the risk control from the S3 are much better than the 
S1. In this sense, if the IPP is going for the long-term strategy, S3 is more favored. 
 
Figure 5-15 Expected Monthly Revenue and CVaR for Different Strategies 
5.6.3 Out-of-Sample for Actual Performance 
When applying the 2013 real data to the three strategies, the actual revenue are realized, which 
will be used to evaluate project owner’s profit and rate of return. Meanwhile, for the long-term 
and hybrid strategy, the benefit sharing between the two parties of the contract will also be 
revealed. 
Table 5-6 Actual Revenue and Benefit Sharing with Different Strategies (Year 2013) 
 
Short-term Long-term S2 Long-term S3 Hybrid 
Actual Revenue ($) 7.36E+07 6.6547E+07 6.56E+07 7.14E+07 
IPP Surplus ($) 9.82E+06 2.87E+06 1.93E+06 7.68E+06 
Rate of Return 15.56% 4.51% 3.03% 12.05% 
Buyer's Surplus ($) 
 
1.07E+06 2.01E+06 2.87E+06 
Overall Surplus ($) 
 
3.94E+06 3.94E+06 1.05E+07 
Observation 5.12 Although the long-term strategy control the volatility in the planning phase, the 
amount of profit that it sacrifices is significant, which is even less than one-third of the possible 
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profit capacity from the short-term strategy (Table 5-6). When the long-term offtake strategy is 
utilized, there need some extra benefit to make the contract attractive.  
All these results explain why the long-term contracts are more favored for their risk control 
mechanism, while the project cannot realize self-sustainment purely through the contracts but 
should rely on some external support. In practice, For example, tax equity holder are willing to 
invest so that they can take advantage of the tax credit and accelerated depreciation; investment 
equity holders are negotiating about the ownership of the Renewable Energy Credits (RECs).  
The hybrid strategy, on the other hand, is expected to balance the advantage of the short-term and 
the long-term strategy. Meanwhile, it is also eligible for the external benefits that long-term 
strategy has, which makes it more attractive. 
5.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we propose a new hybrid offtake strategy for wind energy projects which 
integrates the short-term wholesale market offtake and the long-term PPA contract offtake, as 
discussed in the previous two chapters. The essential idea is to find a trade-off between the 
revenue and the risks through the flexibility to allocate the generation capacity between the long-
term and short-term offtake.  
The challenge to design such a strategy is the different time scale and settlement procedure 
between the two channels. An integrated methodology needs to be identified to completely 
address the interdependent relationship and to solve the two strategies simultaneously. 
A two-level stochastic optimization model was developed in this chapter, with which the first 
level (long-term contract design) incorporates the solutions from the second level (short-term 
bidding strategy) as a feedback, and the second level treats the first level as a leader and makes 
the decision as a follower. In the end, with iterative dynamic feedback searching, the strategies 
for both channels are solved simultaneously. 
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With the solutions verified by the 100 samples, the characteristics and advantages of the hybrid 
strategy can be summarized as the following threefold: 
1. The hybrid strategy realizes the balance between the revenue and the risk control. It helps to 
maintain a high level of fulfillment for the PPA contract, thus is able to avoid 
underperformance penalties, and maintain steady cash flow with smaller volatility. 
Meanwhile, with less contracted generation capacity, the wind IPPs are entitled with much 
more flexibility to allocate the remaining generation to the wholesale market, thus maximize 
the overall revenue. 
2. The flexibility of allocating the generations can be regarded as options when IPPs are making 
decisions on wait-and-see scenarios. It largely enhances the IPPs’ capability of capturing the 
wholesale market volatility and avoiding unnecessary delivery to the PPA due to 
outperformance. 
3. With the hybrid strategy, wind IPPs sign off less amount of promised delivery to the long-
term PPA contract. The two offtake channels can then be treated as complementary buffers to 
each other, thus both the PPA contract buyer and the wholesale market manager can expect a 
higher reliability from the wind project. 
The out-of-sample analysis justifies the model building and the observations. It also verifies the 
effectiveness of the strategy in terms of the benefit and risk sharing outcome among different 
stakeholders.  
In the end, the pros and cons of the three different offtake strategies are discussed. The hybrid 
offtake strategy combines the advantages from both the other two strategies and provides the 
trade-off between the revenue and risks. Meanwhile, a well-designed strategy enhances the 
surplus of both parties within the long-term relationship, thus obtains a higher overall value for 
the supply chain. 
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Chapter 6.  Summaries and Conclusions 
This dissertation proposes three offtake strategies for wind project development in the U.S., 
namely short-term, long-term, and hybrid strategies. After an introduction to research background 
and early literatures in the first two chapters, chapter three and chapter four developed modified 
short-term and long-term offtake models that incorporate risk control modules and stakeholder 
relationship management into the decision making process. Chapter five, furthermore, proposed a 
new hybrid offtake approach that integrates the advantages of existing strategies and achieve an 
optimal balance between revenue maximization and risk minimization. 
This research provides insights on the analysis method and systematic design for offtake 
strategies in a wind energy project development. The study offers a better understanding of 
managing the uncertainty of wind resource and power market, therefore allows project developers 
to improve project revenue streams, effectively reduce the levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE), and 
ultimately enhance the viability of renewable energy projects.  
6.1  Summaries of Proposed Methodologies and Results 
Different methodologies and problem solving techniques are applied in each chapter.  
The short-term offtake deals with the decision making in the electricity wholesale spot market. In 
order to incorporate the minimization for the revenue cash flow volatility, a metric called 
Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) is introduced. With the mathematical transformation by 
defining a so-called F function, the short-term offtake problem is then expressed as a stochastic 
linear programming and is solved by commercially available software. 
The long-term offtake strategy considers a multi-year bilateral contract called Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA) with electricity buyers. A stochastic programming model is proposed to 
optimize the strategy, maximize the discounted cash flow and minimize the CVaR of the revenue 
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flows. Meanwhile, in order to incorporate the buyer’s no-regret threshold, a chance-constraint 
related to the market value of the electricity production is embedded as a stakeholder relationship 
management and negotiation module. The heuristic Genetic Algorithm is then used to deal with 
the complicated solving procedure. 
Finally, the hybrid offtake strategy is discussed endowing the project developer with more 
flexibility to balance and hedge against the volatile factors during the project operation. A two-
level stochastic programming is proposed to combine the decision making for long-term and 
short-term as an integrated model. In the model, the first level is to optimize the long-term 
contract design as a here-and-now decision making, while the second level deals with the 
dynamic bidding strategy in the wholesale market as a wait-and-see decision during the project 
operation. A feedback loop is the key of the two-level optimization, where the first level 
incorporates the solutions from the second level as a feedback, and the second level treats the first 
level as a leader and makes the decision as a follower. With an affine controller for the second 
level and GA for the first level, the solutions for the allocation between the two offtake channels 
can be solved simultaneously. 
As observed from the discussion part of each chapters, the proposed modification for the short-
term and long-term strategy enhance the expected revenue and risk control for the project, on top 
of the traditional method. The hybrid model further improve the performance of the project not 
only by balancing the two options, but also by realizing better benefit and risk sharing through the 
contract design. The out-of-sample analysis of the actual Cape Wind project also justifies the 




6.2 Contribution to the Body of Knowledge and Practical Application 
The topic of this dissertation is inspired by industrial practical needs and academia knowledge 
gaps about offtake strategies for wind energy projects, especially considering the uncertain 
environment where the project is proposed, designed, financed and operated. It is expected that 
the framework and the methodologies proposed in the dissertation will provide wind project 
developers with systematic and quantitative approaches for developing their offtake strategies.  
Two issues are mainly addressed: (1) what are good offtake strategies for wind projects, and (2) 
how to design and execute the strategies considering the uncertainties. The methodologies 
proposed will help to estimate the value of the project more accurately, to improve the long-term 
profit, and to better control the revenue flow risks. The topic covers the subjects of project risk 
management, game theory, operations research, contract engineering, and system control. 
Given the unique nature of wind projects, it is a significant challenge to address the stochastic 
nature of the project operation and offtake environment. In our model, special attention is paid to 
the uncertainty with the future cash flow in terms of the volatility of the wind resource and the 
unstable electricity market price. In particular, the risk management fully takes the stochastic 
nature into consideration through controlling the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) of the cash 
flow. 
Furthermore, this research innovatively proposes a hybrid strategy combining short-term decision 
making and long-term contract design. With the specific two-level stochastic optimization model, 
the project developers are provided with more flexibility allocating their production and will be 
able to better balance the potential opportunities, and hedge the possible risks.  
Although this research primarily focuses on the wind project, the strategies and methodology 
proposed can be extended to cover other similar renewable energy projects, such as solar PV, 
concentrated solar power (CSP), and hydro power projects. The PPA design and the two-level 
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feedback strategy design can also be applied in a broader set of project types in terms of the 
contract negotiation and stakeholder relationship management.  
6.3 Limitations and Future Researches 
There are several directions that the research can be improved and future researches can be 
conducted. 
Firstly, we make some simplification of the project cost, so that the main objective we consider 
for the offtake strategy is to deal with the revenue, instead of profit. We assume the variable cost 
for the project as zero considering the net zero fuel use, and only consider the capital cost as a 
monthly constant. If the actual operation cost could be better estimated and included in the future 
cash flow, the profit streams will be more accurately evaluated and fit more to the reality. 
Secondly, we only consider the unsubsidized situation, and also exclude the potential revenue 
from the REC market. However, most of the renewable projects are eligible for tax credit or some 
federal/state credit program. In fact, many project investors are only interested in the renewable 
energy project when they can take advantage of these programs. Therefore, a potential interesting 
topic associated with this will be the public policy design and their impact on the project offtake 
strategies. 
Last but not least, the accuracy of the estimation for the stochastic variables is always a technical 
challenge for prediction models. In our discussion, we only assume the most basic Weibull 
distribution for wind speed and normal distribution for market prices. Another improvement of 
the model and a future direction to apply the model into practice will be to incorporate more 




Appendix A Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) (Adapted from 
(Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000)) 
Figure A-1 illustrates the definition for 𝛽 -VaR and 𝛽 -CVaR, on a hypothesis loss function 
distribution.  
 
Figure A-1 Illustration for Definition of 𝛽-VaR and 𝛽-CVaR 
By definition, VaR is the percentile of the loss distribution, i.e., with a specified confidence level 
𝛽. The 𝛽-VaR is the lowest amount 𝛼 such that, with probability 𝛽, the loss is less or equal to 𝛼. 
With 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) defined as the loss function, the probability of 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) not exceeding a threshold 𝛼 is 
given by: 
𝛹(𝑥, 𝛼) = ∫ 𝑝(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑓(𝑥,𝑦)≤𝛼
 
Therefore 𝛽-VaR is expressed as: 
 𝛼𝛽(𝑥) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝛼 ∈ 𝑅:𝛹(𝑥, 𝛼) ≥ 𝛽} (A-1) 
𝛽- Conditional Value-at-Risk (𝛽-CVaR), on the other hand, is defined as the conditional 
expectation of the loss associated with 𝑥 relative to that loss being 𝛼𝛽(𝑥) or greater, which is to 
be expressed as: 
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 𝜙𝛽(𝑥) = (1 − 𝛽)
−1 × ∫ 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑝(y)𝑑y
𝑓(𝑥,𝑦)≥𝛼𝛽(𝑥)
 (A-2) 
The key to the approach to quantitatively evaluate 𝛽-CVaR of the underlining asset is to define 
the function of 𝐹𝛽 as follows: 
 𝐹𝛽(𝑥, 𝛼) = 𝛼 + (1 − 𝛽)
−1 × ∫ [𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) − 𝛼]+𝑝(y)𝑑y
𝑓(𝑥,𝑦)≥𝛼𝛽(𝑥)
 (A-3) 
It has been approved that minimizing the 𝛽-CVaR of the loss associated with 𝑥 over all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 is 
equivalent to minimizing 𝐹𝛽(𝑥, 𝛼) over all (𝑥, 𝛼) ∈ 𝑋 × ℝ, in the sense that  
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜙𝛽(𝑥) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐹𝛽(𝑥, 𝛼) (A-4) 
Meanwhile, the integral in the definition (A-3) can be approximated by sampling the probability 
distribution of 𝑦 according to its density 𝑝(𝑦). If the sampling generates a collection of vectors 
𝑦1, 𝑦2, … 𝑦𝑞, then the corresponding approximation to 𝐹𝛽(𝑥, 𝛼) is 
 ?̃?𝛽(𝑥, 𝛼) = 𝛼 +
1
𝑞(1 − 𝛽)







Appendix B Affine Controller (Adapted from (Skaf and Boyd 2010)) 
Consider a discrete-time linear time-varying system, which satisfies the following system 
transition: 
 𝑥(𝑡 + 1) = 𝐴(𝑡)𝑥(𝑡) + 𝐵(𝑡)𝑢(𝑡) + 𝑤(𝑡), 𝑡 = 0,… , 𝑇 − 1 (B-1) 
Equation  (B-1) can be rewritten as:  




















































and     𝑥0 = (𝑥(0), 𝐴0
1𝑥(0), … , 𝐴0
𝑇𝑥(0)𝑇 
where 𝐴𝜏
𝑡 = 𝐴(𝑡 − 1)𝐴(𝑡 − 2)⋯𝐴(𝜏), and 𝐴𝑡
𝑡 = 𝐼 
Then we consider a causal feedback affine controller, which have the form of: 



















Then we will have 
 𝑢 = 𝐹𝑥 + 𝑢0 (B-4) 








Where P is called close-loop matrix 




𝑃𝑥𝑤 = 𝐺 + 𝐻𝐹(𝐼 − 𝐻𝐹)
−1𝐺 
𝑃𝑢𝑤 = 𝐹(1 − 𝐻𝐹)
−1𝐺 
And  
?̃? = 𝑥0 +𝐻𝑢0 +𝐻𝐹(𝐼 − 𝐻𝐹)
−1(𝑥0 +𝐻𝑢0) 
?̃? = 𝐹(𝐼 − 𝐻𝐹)−1(𝑥0 +𝐻𝑢0) + 𝑢0 
The optimization problem is in general not convex in the design variables 𝐹 and 𝑢0. By a suitable 
Q-design procedure, however, these problems can be cast as convex optimization problems, and 
therefore solved efficiently: 
Define  
 𝑄 = 𝐹(𝐼 − 𝐻𝐹)−1 (B-7) 
Then 
      𝐹 = (𝐼 + 𝑄𝐻)−1 
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Define   
 𝑟 = (𝐼 + 𝑄𝐻)𝑢0 (B-8) 
Then 
     𝑢 = (𝐼 + 𝐹𝐻)𝑟 
Then the close-loop matrix P becomes 







?̃? = (𝐼 + 𝐻𝑄)𝑥0 +𝐻𝑟 
?̃? = 𝑄𝑥0 + 𝑟 
Therefore: 
 𝑥 = (𝐼 + 𝐻𝑄)𝐺𝑊 + (𝐼 + 𝐻𝑄)𝑥0 +𝐻𝑟 (B-10) 
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